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Abstract
By applying structural-functionalist theories of deviance and opposition, this thesis deconstructs
nonstate mobilization in the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Using data
from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset, the quantitative analysis interpreted both
group and leader behavior in conflict situations to determine factors that influenced conflict
onset and resolution. The quasipoisson regression analysis of group behavior suggested that
polity and state capacity were both significant predictors of violent and nonviolent mobilization.
The negative binomial regression of regime behavior suggested that civilian casualties were the
most significant predictor of a government response to nonstate mobilization. Ultimately, the
results suggested that the influence of regime repression on human rights was one of the most
salient catalysts for nonstate mobilization in the region.
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Introduction
In 1893, at the height of his career, Émile Durkheim published his seminal work The
Division of Labor in Society. In it, he applied a structural-functionalist mode of thinking to
attempt to explain the emergence of anomie and deviant behavior in society. He hypothesized
that people in society were linked together by a collective consciousness, which he asserted acted
as a unifying force that bonded a group of people together through sets of shared ideas, beliefs,
and morals. This collective consciousness served to hold society together and set boundaries for
what behavior was acceptable. In this model, crime was necessary to police the margins of the
collective consciousness and reinforce the types of morals and beliefs that the society chose to
value and abide by. Consequently, Durkheim claimed, crime and other forms of opposition in
society were inevitable.
In 1918, a year after Durkheim’s death, World War I ended and the former Ottoman
territories that would come to comprise the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
(MENAP) were divided up by foreign powers with little knowledge of or care for traditional
social, political, ethnic, or religious divisions. This significantly altered the formation of organic
societies in the region and, Durkheim would argue, created the types of discord within the
haphazardly constructed states that was bound to manifest as a profound disruption of the
collective consciousness. The imperialist cleavages would only deepen as the region gained
strategic significance due to the discovery of vast oil reserves and its geographic placement that
made it an ideal route for transporting goods between the Eastern and Western hemispheres.
However, because these foreign interests prevailed over local ethnic, religious, and political
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customs, the region saw a rise in both violent and nonviolent expressions of factionalism and
sectarianism as the realities of living within the constraints of arbitrarily drawn borders set in.
This thesis aims to use Durkheim’s structural-functionalist approach to deviance to
understand how the development of social and domestic factors in the region has influenced the
culture of nonstate opposition and dissent. The MENAP region was chosen because of the
significant resources foreign countries have invested in the region since the Cold War and the
influence that has had on the development of the region’s political culture. Furthermore, its
legacy of authoritarianism and its current state of flux following the Arab Spring uprisings of
2011 present a natural experiment within which to study how different regimes respond to
nonstate opposition. Figure 1.1 illustrates a hot spot analysis representing clusters of extreme
polity scores and confirms that the MENAP region does indeed represent a statistically
significant cluster of authoritarian regimes. Thus, by focusing on this region, this thesis can
inform important policy decisions as well as offer insights into unresolved issues in the literature
concerning the influence of a state’s regime type on its experience with nonstate groups.

7

The main quantitative analysis will be conducted in two chapters that separately consider
the behavior of nonstate groups and the behavior of state leaders in times of domestic crisis. In
order to unify the interpretations of the two analysis, the overarching structural-functionalist
theory of deviance proposed by Durkheim—and described at the beginning of this section—will
be applied to the final conclusion drawn in the last section. Specifically, what has come to be
known as the labeling theory of deviance, which posits that behavior can only violate punishable
social norms when it can have a collectively agreed upon label applied to it, is used to illustrate
how the roles of state and nonstate actors are connected at the initiation and resolution phases of
domestic crises. This sheds light on how grievances emerge, how they are acted on, and at what
point they are labeled as undesirable by society or by the government. It can also explain why
governments choose to interact with some groups and not others, especially when paired with
other theories—such as the radical flank effect.
Since this thesis aims to explore the phenomenon of nonstate mobilization at the
region-level (as opposed to the state- or group-levels), and since the region contains multitudes
of diversity in terms of domestic governance and societal structures, the most appropriate way to
conduct a generalizable analysis was to explore instances of civil conflict and opposition from
the perspective both of the factors that motivate nonstate groups to mobilize and the factors that
motivate leaders and their governments to respond to these challenges. These analyses are
presented in separate chapters as two distinct perspectives on the same core issue. The
cumulative results of the analyses are meant to inform the factors that motivate opposing sides to
engage with each other in order to formulate more efficient policies to mitigate and resolve
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conflicts. The thesis is structured to address this issue from multiple perspectives in order to
generate the most meaningful results and will thus be composed of three sections that will aim to
address the issue of nonstate mobilization from a holistic perspective.
Chapter One explores the extant literature on nonstate groups in the MENAP region to
establish a basic understanding of the types of groups that exist, how they gain support, and how
their structures influence their engagement with the state. The chapter also highlights some
variables that have been found to influence group formation that inform the analyses that are
conducted in the next two chapters. Chapter Two aims to understand what motivates groups to
mobilize against the state. Using a country-year analysis of trends in event occurrences, the
analysis tests the effect of changes in refugee populations, a state’s respect for its citizen’s
human rights, the type of political system present in a state, and the state’s capacity to provide
services and security to its people on the number of violent and nonviolent events that occur in a
country per year. The results of the analysis suggests that regime type and state capacity are the
most reliable predictors of nonstate mobilization, with weaker democracies being more
vulnerable to violent events while stronger democracies are more prone to nonviolent events.
Chapter Three turns to the question of government response to nonstate mobilization to
understand what factors motivate leaders and their governments to respond to nonstate
challenges. The research analyzes ‘turning points’ that represent strategically significant actions
by the government to shift the tide of a conflict in their favor. These include cooperative actions
(agreements & nonviolent transfers of territory) and coercive actions (mass arrests or arrests of
high profile rebel leaders). A country-year analysis was run to determine the effect of executive
leadership turnover, regime type, civilian casualties, and changes in foreign investment on the
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two dependent variables. The analysis found that civilian casualties were the most reliable
predictor of both cooperative and coercive action, while increased leadership turnover only
influenced cooperative action and regime type only influenced coercive action. The final section
offers concluding thoughts and describes the cumulative significance of the results from Chapter
Two and Chapter Three, as well as the implications for leaders and policymakers. It also offers
directions for future research and a discussion of the limitations of this study.
By departing from the Durkheimian assumption that society is made of interrelated
components whose actions and reactions are interconnected, this thesis aims to present the
interrelated nature of opposing actors and how the onset and resolution of a civil conflict is
closely tied to several domestic factors within a state. The multidisciplinary approach applied in
this analysis hopes to expand on extant analytical methods by accounting for rational behavior
when it arises, as well as highlight the human cost that conflict has on civilians in affected areas.
It also hopes to shed light on different ways of thinking about and analyzing current trends in the
conflict literature in an effort to inform better policy recommendations.
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Chapter One
Despite coming to the fore of the collective consciousness after the stunning attacks of
September 11th 2001, nonstate groups operating in the Middle East and North Africa had been
garnering the attention of both domestic and international leaders since states began to take
shape. These groups cited a wide variety of motivations for banding together and chose various
methods and organizational structures to suit their goals. For example, the region saw the rise of
militant Islamist groups in the wake of the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989 when
mujahideen (holy warriors) trained by the CIA during the war were emboldened by the prospect
of expanding the jihad they had just fought in Afghanistan to the rest of the world.1 Not all
groups are religiously motivated, however. Many nonstate groups such as those active in
Palestine have political motives relevant to the ongoing conflict the Palestinian territories have
been engaging in with Israel since it occupied the state in 1967.2 Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah
al-ʾIslāmiyyah (Hamas), which emerged in the late-1980s as an organization aimed at providing
social services and political representation to the Palestinian people while countering the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is one example of this type of organization.3
Additionally, many nonstate groups have formed on the basis of ethnic identities, such as the
nonviolent Pashtun Tahafuz Movement, which has mobilized along ethnic lines to advocate for
increased rights for the Pashtun people residing in the northwestern provinces of Pakistan.4
It is important to note, however, that although violent groups get a lot of attention in both
the media and in academic research for the strategies they deploy to achieve their goals, in order

Bearden, M. (2001). Afghanistan, graveyard of empires. Foreign Affairs, p. 27.
Berti, B. (2015). Non-state actors as providers of governance: The Hamas government in Gaza between effective
sovereignty, centralized authority, and resistance. The Middle East Journal, 69( 1), p. 9.
3
Berti, “Non-state actors as providers of governance,” p. 10.
4
Yousaf, F. (2019). Pakistan’s “Tribal” Pashtuns, Their “Violent” Representation, and the Pashtun Tahafuz
Movement. Original Research. pp. 1-2.
1
2
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to understand how this complex web of subnational actors influence national behavior it will also
be necessary to investigate the influence of nonviolent nonstate groups on state stability. The
successful deployment of nonviolent tactics in a region where it has been found that people view
violent actions by nonstate groups as the only way to get things done5 is an interesting
phenomenon, indeed. And if the issue of stability is to be addressed in the region, an
understanding of how groups such as Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party, the Islamic Action
Society, and the Islamic Labor Organization6 have been able to gain influence will be necessary
to understand the larger picture.
Why some groups choose violence
One of the central questions that has plagued researchers who study nonstate
groups—and an important consideration for this study to account for—concerns the motivation
for some groups to turn to violence while others remain committed to solving problems through
peaceful means. One of the most common theories to explain the turn to violent methods by
violent groups revolves around rational choice theory and the role it plays in asymmetric
conflicts.7 As it is currently elucidated, the theory posits that nonstate groups use violence as a
means to achieve a political end; however, since nonstate groups generally do not have the
means to wage a full-scale war against the government of the state with which they are
dissatisfied, they are forced to use methods that allow them to attack the state in a more indirect
manner.8

Fair, C. C., Malhotra, N., & Shapiro, J. N. (2009). The roots of militancy: Explaining support for political violence
in Pakistan. Working Paper, Princeton University. p. 4 and Shapiro, J. N., & Fair, C. C. (2010). Understanding
support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan. International Security, 34(3), p. 83.
6
Asal, V., Schulzke, M., & Pate, A. (2016). Why do some organizations kill while others do not: An examination of
Middle Eastern organizations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 13(4), p. 830.
7
Caplan, B. (2006). Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model. Public Choice, 128, p. 105.
8
Crenshaw, M. (2007). The logic of terrorism. Terrorism in perspective, 24, p. 24; Berrebi, C. (2009). The
Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful? Social
5

12

The logic behind these types of attacks is that since they tend to be both unpredictable
and destructive, the state will face domestic pressure to give in to policy changes to mitigate
costs from possible future attacks.9 This method of conflict has proven to be very effective for
nonstate groups in the Middle East, as it allows them to avoid protracted civil war-like conflicts
with states—which could be very costly and detrimental to the weaker group in the long
run—while still helping the group achieve its goals. Studies such as Pape (2003) have supported
this theory by illustrating the efficacy of suicide bombing attacks at achieving a nonstate group’s
policy goals in civil war settings.10 Therefore, this strategy serves both to improve the group’s
legitimacy and credibility in the state in which it is operating.11 Additionally, by creating fear in
the populace through the use of sporadic violence, nonstate groups are also able to maintain a
degree of control over the population in the state in which they are active which ultimately helps
to expand their influence over the government in the target country.12
Thus, considering the ease with which violent groups are able to exert and maintain
influence over both the people and the government, why do some groups choose to remain
nonviolent? And how are they able to achieve success without being able to exert the same
coercive methods as violent groups? Although the body of literature that seeks to answer these
questions remains small, many interesting trends have already begun to emerge from the extant
research. For example, Abrahms (2006) highlighted many of the areas where much of the
“rational choice” research on violence fell short and how those results painted a very different

Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the pieces together, p. 193; and Anderton, C. H., & Carter, J. R. (2005). On
rational choice theory and the study of terrorism. Defense and Peace Economics, 16( 4), p. 275.
9
Kydd, A. H., & Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. International security, 31( 1), p. 49.
10
Pape, R. A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review, 97( 3), p. 351.
11
Kydd & Walter, “The strategies of terrorism,” p. 51.
12
Kydd & Walter, “The strategies of terrorism,” p. 50.
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picture about the efficacy of violent strategies.13 Abrahms conceded that state strength did
influence the efficacy of violence as a means to achieve political goals; however, he pointed out
that extant research largely ignored that most had the capacity to respond to sporadic violence
perpetrated by nonstate groups for long enough to prevent weak groups from waging consistent
(and, therefore, significantly destructive) attacks.14 Moreover, after analyzing actions taken by
twenty-eight groups that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State
Department, Abrahms found that when nonstate groups employed violent tactics against civilians
it significantly decreased their chances of achieving government concessions—regardless of
what their policy objectives were.15
In addition, according to Chenoweth & Stephan (2008) nonviolent methods tend to be
inherently more favorable for attrition for two main reasons. The first being that nonviolent
groups tend to be viewed as more legitimate both in the domestic and international arenas, which
aids them in garnering more widespread participation.16 Second, whereas terrorist and other
violent nonstate groups are viewed as having more extremist views that necessitate harsh
government responses, nonviolent groups are viewed as more moderate, which makes them a
more appealing prospect for negotiations and concessions.17 In sum, nonviolence has been found
to be effective due to its ability to engender both widespread support in both the domestic and
international arena, as well as for its high success rate in achieving concessions through
negotiations with the state government.

Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. International Security, 31(2), p. 43.
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Chenoweth, E., & Stephan, M. J. (2008). Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict.
International security, 33( 1) pp. 8-9.
17
Chenoweth & Stephan, “Why civil resistance works,” p. 9.
13
14
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These arguments have also stood up to quantitative scrutiny, with studies finding that
factors like democratic government and its associated characteristics—such as independent
judiciaries, lack of corruption, and the rule of law—were positively correlated to state stability.18
However, other researchers have found the autocratic regimes are better equipped to ensure the
stability of their states due to the repressive mechanisms at their disposal that allow them to
suppress dissent before it can evolve into violent opposition.19 Conjointly, analyzing the states
capability to maintain relatively stable conditions during conflict has also proven to be
enlightenighting. For example, crisis duration,20 number of opposing actors,21 and conflict
incidence22 have all been found to influence state stability.
Nonstate groups and the people
Nonstate mobilization is not unique to the MENAP region. Expressing discontent with
the state has been the natural antithesis to the consolidation of power characteristic of the
Westphalian system. In the Middle East, many groups have emerged in so-called ‘ungoverned
spaces’—spaces outside of the authority of the central government either as a result of state
incapacity, war, or historical opposition to outside rule—to provide political representation,
social services, and safety to the people they have charged themselves with representing.23 For
example, militant nonstate groups have gained significant support in Pakistan for their ability to
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DeRouen, K., & Goldfinch, S. (2012). What makes a state stable and peaceful? Good governance, legitimacy and
legal-rationality matter even more for low-income countries. Civil Wars, 14( 4), pp. 509-512.
19
Peksen, D., & Lounsbery, M. (2012). Beyond the target state: Foreign military intervention and neighboring state
stability. International Interactions, 38(3), p. 366.
20
Mishali-Ram, M. (2009). Powerful actors make a difference: Theorizing power attributes of nonstate actors.
International Journal of Peace Studies, 14(2), p. 67.
21
Mishali-Ram, “Powerful actors make a difference,” p. 68.
22
Rudolfsen, I. (2017). State capacity, inequality and inter-group violence in sub-Saharan Africa: 1989–2011. Civil
Wars, 19( 2), p. 135.
23
Baylouny, A. M. (2010). Authority outside the State, Non-State Actors and New Institutions in the Middle East. p.
137.
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affect change in a country whose political system struggles with poor government-civilian
relationship and rampant corruption amongst government officials.24 Moreover, by offering
social services and aid to the people (most notably in the wake of the devastating 2010 floods),
Pakistan’s nonstate groups have been able to further delegitimize the government and grow
support for their militant agendas.25
The strategy of using humanitarian aid as a means of gaining favor with the people by
violent nonstate groups is a common strategy that is not unique to groups in Pakistan. In fact, it
has been recorded as having been successfully deployed by groups in Syria,26 Lebanon,27 and
Palestine28 as well. In addition to providing relief and bureaucratic services, these violent
nonstate groups can also gain favor with the people by offering them security, as was seen in
Palestine,29 Lebanon,30 and Afghanistan.31 Highlighting the function that these groups play in the
respective countries adds important context to the analysis of the influence of nonstate groups on
the stability of the Middle East, as it illustrates the fact that most groups could not survive by
solely attacking the government. Indeed, they require the broader support of the people to

Constable, P (2011). Playing with Fire. Random House Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. Loc. 65 and Shapiro &
Fair, “Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan,” p. 83.
25
Shapiro & Fair, “Understanding support for Islamist militancy in Pakistan,” p. 92 & Constable, “Playing with
Fire,” Loc. 216.
26
Podder, S. (2014). Mainstreaming the non-state in bottom-up state-building: Linkages between rebel governance
and post-conflict legitimacy. Conflict, Security & Development, 14(2), p. 236.
27
DeVore, M. R., & Stähli, A. B. (2015). Explaining Hezbollah's effectiveness: Internal and external determinants
of the rise of violent non-state actors. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27( 2), p. 332.
28
Grynkewich, A. G. (2008). Welfare as warfare: How violent non-state groups use social services to attack the
state. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31( 4), p. 350.
29
Berti, B., & Gutiérrez, B. (2016). Rebel-to-political and back? hamas as a security provider in Gaza between
rebellion, politics, and governance. Democratization, 23( 6), p. 1060.
30
Hazbun, W. (2016). Assembling security in a ‘weak state’: the contentious politics of plural governance in
Lebanon since 2005. Third World Quarterly, 37(6), p. 1058.
31
Schetter, C., Glassner, R., & Karokhail, M. (2007). Beyond warlordism: the local security architecture in
Afghanistan. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2, p. 142.
24
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achieve their goals and one way to garner that support is through illuminating the ways in which
the government has failed the people by filling in those gaps.
Similarly, nonviolent groups also attempt to gain favor with the people by offering them
necessary services that the government may have been struggling to provide. As was mentioned
above, when this strategy is deployed by nonviolent groups it tends to help them gain widespread
support from both the local and international communities, as their views are seen to be more
moderate and their goals more worthy of concession.32 It is also important to note that the areas
in which violent and nonviolent groups operate tend to overlap. Therefore, there can be areas
where violent and nonviolent groups both provide services to the people while having vastly
different reasons for doing so. Violent groups, for example, may provide services to the people
as a means to coerce them, while nonviolent groups may do so as a means to provide mutual aid
to an underserved population.33 Nonviolent groups have also been known to provide
supplemental services to areas that are neglected by both violent groups and the government.34
These can include forming political parties or other politically-motivated activism or advocacy
groups, groups that seek to promote ethnic and cultural preservation, and religious groups that
offer aid and support to marginalized and disaster-stricken groups.35
Although nonstate groups—whether violent or nonviolent—serve to satisfy some of the
same functions for the people, it is important to understand the different motivations that drive
the behaviors that nonstate actors exhibit in attempting to garner the support of the people, as it
can help to explain why violent groups can gain such widespread support relative to nonviolent

32

Chenoweth & Stephan, “Why civil resistance works,” p. 9.
 aylouny, A. M. (2010). Authority outside the State, Non-State Actors and New Institutions in the Middle East. p.
B
137.
34
Baylouny, “Authority outside the State,” p. 137.
35
Asal, Schulzke, & Pate, “Why do some organizations kill while others do not” p. 813.
33
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groups. In addition, it also suggests that nonviolent groups have the potential to gain widespread
success if the factors that influence support for violent groups—such as poverty,36 material
deprivation,37 and repression38—are mitigated. In the next section, the relationship between
nonstate groups and the state will be explored further with the aim of illustrating how vital these
groups are to the political ecosystem of the Middle East, for better or for worse.
Nonstate groups and the state
Especially of interest to this thesis is the relationship that nonstate groups have to the
state (in terms of how the state responds to actions taken by groups), and how these relationships
influence the stability of the region as a whole. When exploring the relationship nonstate groups
have to the state, it is important to understand how these groups form not only to serve their own
interests but to fill a void left by the state. Although this point has already been touched on in this
literature review, it is important to emphasize that the MENAP region has always functioned in
ways that are reflective both of its peoples’ conception of administrative subdivisions, as well as
in ways that have been hindered or benefitted by foreign intervention. With this in mind, in order
to understand why nonstate groups proliferate, it is important to remember the societal role many
of them play as providers of security, services, and governance in areas of reduced governmental
authority. It is also important to consider the factors that have allowed these ungoverned spaces
to emerge and the role that has played in setting the current landscape in the region.
The previous sections of this literature review have attempted to shed light on how both
violent and nonviolent nonstate groups function both in the context of their relations with the
target state’s government, as well as with its people. Similarities in approaches have also been
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political science review,
97(1), p. 88.
37
Agnew, R. (2010). A general strain theory of terrorism. Theoretical Criminology, 14(2), p. 132.
38
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative politics, 13( 4), p. 384.
36
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explored, such as the strategic deployment of humanitarian aid as either a means of coercion or
as a means of addressing an area where government response is otherwise lacking. Furthermore,
since many violent and nonviolent groups tend to occupy similar roles in the political ecosystem
of the Middle East, establishing a better understanding of where in the group formation process
the two types of groups divert could aid in minimizing (and possibly eradicating) the continuing
influence of violent nonstate groups on the stability of the Middle East.
This question is especially relevant for foreign policymakers who have a long history of
attempting to implement policies in the region that have seemingly backfired in the long run.
This thesis aims to show how the historically decentralized nature necessitates the existence of
nonstate groups in the region, but that with an understanding of how these groups are formed,
how they recruit, and how they interact with the state, the people and each other, the U.S. can
begin to implement policies that are able to affect change in the region in a more comprehensive
manner. A common notion about the Middle East shared by most Westerners is that the region is
homogenous and that “one-size-fits-all” policies can be applied to the region; however, the
existence of all these competing groups illustrates that the decentralized nature of the region is
something that requires special attention and care by policymakers if they truly intend on
realizing their vision for progress in the Middle East.
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Chapter Two
In the 2000s, a dormant insurgent group reemerged in the Balochistan province of
Pakistan. The Baloch people had had a long tumultuous history with various governing powers
that had exercised authority over the mountainous western region west of the Indus River since
the age of British colonial rule up through Pakistan's current federalist system of governmental
administration.39 Accounts vary on when the current iteration of the group known as the
Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) reemerged,40 but scholars agree that the coup of 1999 and
the radical political shift that followed served as important catalysts in exacerbating existing
Baloch grievances while simultaneously sparking new ones.41
There were several unique factors that reemerged in the early 2000s that led to the
mobilization of the BLF. The first of these was the significant shift towards authoritarianism
Following the 1999 coup that facilitated the ascension of Pervez Musharraf to the office of
president, which was fundamentally incompatible with the leftist ideology of the new BLF
movement.42 Moreover, the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2003 increased the already
large share of Afghan refugees in the western tribal regions of Pakistan, which already had a
long history of accepting temporary laborers from the across the relatively Porous Afghanistan
border; however, the areas were ill-equipped to sustain the permanent settlement of the Afghan
refugees, which lead to an increase in ethnic and separatist attacks.43 Additionally, the early
2000s saw the intensified exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources, most notably through a
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bilateral agreement between Pakistan and China to build a port in Gwadar that would have
limited the Baloch people’s ability to sustain their economy based on fishing.44 Although the
plans were ultimately abandoned, a new bilateral agreement between China and Pakistan to build
an economic correction to connect Eastern China to the Indian Ocean by way of Gwadar, which
the BLF sees as another government strategy to subvert the territorial autonomy of the province.
These novel issues that emerged alongside the rise of the Musharraf regime exacerbated
existing issues that underpinned the grievances of previous iterations of the Balochi nationalist
movement. The most pressing of which was the socioeconomic marginalization of the residents
of Balochistan by the federal government. Despite being the one of the largest and most resource
rich areas in the country, it was also the poorest, least educated, and least developed of any other
Pakistani province.45 In addition, despite the number of major infrastructure projects that have
taken place in the geographically strategic region to facilitate access to natural resources and
transnational trade routes, the Baloch people have been left out of the planning process and have
seen little of the economic benefit of these projects that were meant to ameliorate some of the
worst developmental conditions in south Asia.46 This issue was especially contentious due to the
disproportionate level resource extraction in the region with the benefits not seen by its people.
These issues can all be traced back to the lack of representation of Baloch people in the Pakistani
bureaucracy, which remains one of the most enduring grievances cited by the BLF.47 Despite
hailing from the largest province in the country, they were disproportionately underrepresented
in the military, the federal government, and other political positions.
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Although this anecdote only represents one out of a multitude of possible cases of
nonstate group mobilization, it highlights some variables that previous research has identified as
common catalysts for nonstate mobilization and helps to introduce the main research question
this chapter seeks to answer; namely: which domestic factors can best predict a rise in the
number of nonstate groups that choose to engage in deviant behavior? This issue will form the
basis of this chapter's analysis, which will analyze country-year event trends to understand how
domestic factors influence the expression of opposition and dissent by both armed and peaceful
nonstate groups. The chapter will proceed as follows: The first section will supplement the extant
literature presented in Chapter One with specific research that will support the theoretical
framework, which will be presented in section two. Section three will describe the research
design for the empirical analysis. Section four will describe the results of that analysis, and the
final section will include a discussion of implications of the results.
Literature
The analysis in this chapter will largely be guided by the labeling theory of crime and
delinquency that emerged from the neo-Marxist school of thought. This school of thought
conceived of delinquency as a byproduct of society and the collective identity it engendered in
its members. Labeling theory, which emerged from the social structural school of thought
revolutionized by Émile Durkeim and forms the basis of this thesis’s understanding of the
motivation of groups to mobilize, posits that deviant behavior is the product of the negative label
imposed on it by society and is largely informed by the power structures that exist within
societies to suppress opposition.48 Because of the theory's power to explain how governments
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(especially authoritarian ones) relate to their citizens, some political science scholars have
adopted it to explain the emergence of conflicts in society.49 Likewise, this thesis had adopted
this theory to guide the research presented here in order to help explain both the emergence of
nonstate groups as well as the differential government response to the opposition these groups
present.
In addition to understanding how societies make sense of criminal behavior through
labeling theory, this chapter will also be guided by the theory of the radical flank effect. This
theory, which was pioneered by Herbert Haines in 1984, is used to describe the influence of
radical members of an organization on that organization's more moderate members, especially as
it relates to a group's tactics and goals.50 Social science researchers have also used the theory to
understand why violent and nonviolent groups emerge in similar contexts—especially when they
are attempting to achieve the same goals.51 Most importantly, the radical flank effect can also
determine how governments interact with groups through positive and negative mechanisms that
serve to condition how deviant behavior will be treated by the authoritative power. Positive
radical flank mechanisms emerge when radical and moderate groups coexist in the same context.
These situations tend to benefit nonviolent movements, which are seen as less radical and
therefore more worthy of governmental concessions than their more radical counterparts.52
Conversely, negative radical mechanisms emerge when the nonstate field is dominated by radical
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groups whose goals and strategies are too incompatible with those of the government. This
typically results in the repression of all opposition and makes it difficult for future campaigns to
be successful.53 The influence of this effect illustrates how some forms of deviance can come to
be rewarded while others can come to bear even more social stigma. This carries significant
influence for how a state’s domestic opposition is formed, how active it is, and how successful it
can ultimately hope to be.
Organizational structure is also influenced by the goals of a campaign, although these
structures are defined differently depending on the strategies of the group (in terms of whether
they use violence or not). Schlichte (2009) outlined three mechanisms that prompted the
emergence of armed nonstate groups with an emphasis on the domestic factors that triggered
these mechanisms.54 According to Schlichte, the ad hoc mechanism of group formation occurs
when certain members of neo-patrimonial populations feel that they are being excluded by
patron-client networks, causing violent rebellion.55 The mechanism of repression is activated
when a group of people experience governmental repression, leading their political opposition to
evolve into armed action. Armed groups that come into being through the mechanism of
repression carry the important distinction of being led by politicians as opposed to military
personnel and typically begin as nonviolent oppositions that become violent as a result of their
repression.56 Finally, the spin-off mechanism is witnessed when a group initially under
government control goes rogue and seeks to achieve their own agendas.57
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Since nonviolent groups tend to coalesce around a desire for societal change, the most
popular metrics of organizational structure tend to be anchored in the size of the social
movement. In order to standardize and quantify this metric, many researchers have typically
followed the dichotomous framework set forth by Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) that categorizes
campaigns based on the breadth of their goals.58 On the one hand, there are maximalist
campaigns, which are defined by their “demand for a radical reshaping of the existing political
order,” and include three major catalysts: demands for regime change, anti-occupation
movements, and self-determination campaigns.59 Conversely, reformist campaigns encompass
movements aimed at affecting drastic policy changes but do not otherwise attempt to alter the
status quo.60 Reformist campaigns include those that advocate for worker’s rights, women’s
rights, environmental protection policies, and other such issues that generally can be resolved
without a dramatic restructuring of the (geo)political landscape. Maximalist a nd reformist
campaigns are also generally distinguished by the level of involvement the campaign is able to
achieve, with maximalist campaigns being characterized by those that can exceed 1,000
participants.61 Developing and abiding by such a framework is especially useful when comparing
violent and nonviolent groups as it allows for the selection of enduring nonviolent nonstate (i.e.
maximalist) groups for a more accurate comparison to enduring violent nonstate groups.
These theories and categorizations each help to describe what this chapter hopes to
illustrate through this analysis: that opposition and resistance are socially conditioned and that
condition affects how a group organizes and mobilizes. Through this framework, the notion that
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the MENAP represents a socially monolithic entity will further be challenged by illustrating how
a state’s domestic factors influence how its citizens view the government and each other. This
will provide an explanation for variation at the group- and state-levels for variations in
country-year event trends that will ultimately inform how the results of the quantitative analysis
should be interpreted.
Theoretical Framework
Transnational migration has long interested conflict scholars for its ability to predict
conflict diffusion. The idea that refugees provided a causal mechanism for this diffusion was first
described by Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006), who proposed that the clustered patterns of conflict
witnessed in certain regions could be explained by the constant transnational flow of refugees
moving between warring countries.62 The authors’ propositions that fluctuations in a state’s
refugee population—either as a result of the refugee population’s direct engagement in hostilities
against the host government or as a result of violence directed at them—could increase the
chance of conflict onset in countries that hosted a large share of refugees from neighboring
countries found empirical support as a mechanism of conflict diffusion.63 Studies have also
confirmed empirical links between flows of forcibly displaced populations and international
conflict between sending and receiving states, as receiving states attempt to stem the flow of
additional refugees across their borders.64
At the time Salehyan and Gleditsch published their study, they noted the perils that
refugees escaping conflict faced and acknowledged that not all refugees had violent intentions
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when traveling to host countries.65 In addition, they cautioned against implementing harsh and
restrictive immigration policies to minimize the threat of violence, citing the counterproductive
nature of forcing innocent bystanders to continue to live in a context where viable opportunities
quickly become engulfed by the opposing sides of a conflict.66 From this more sympathetic
strand of conflict literature, studies have emerged that have acknowledged the trend between
refugee flows and conflict onset described by Salehyan and Gleditsch and attempted to clarify
the causal mechanism that appears to be at play. Some studies have focused on the directionality
of violence and have emphasized the disproportionality of violence perpetrated against refugees
as opposed to violence perpetrated by refugees.67 In particular, studies have found that leaders
who use refugee populations as political scapegoats are more likely to invite harm to be
committed against their refugee populations.68
Similarly, another study aimed at providing nuance to Salehyan and Gleditsch’s results
found that, more often, refugees engaged in conflict with nonstate actors as opposed to state
actors.69 The results of this study were also predicated on a state’s capacity to mitigate the impact
of refugee flows on the host country’s society, with their results indicating that weaker states
were less capable of preventing nonstate groups from engaging refugees in conflict.70 The sum of
the results presented on refugees thus suggests that population changes do, in fact, inspire
nonstate groups to mobilize. However, they also seem to indicate that measuring this
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mobilization at the ‘event’ level as opposed to the ‘conflict’ level would be more prudent in light
of the studies indicating that refugees are more often victims of violence that may not be
recorded as organized conflict.
Hypothesis 1a: As the number of refugees increases in a country,
the number of violent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.
Hypothesis 1b: As the number of refugees increases in a country,
the number of nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.
Especially relevant to the region’s recent history is the influence of human rights abuses
on nonstate group formation and activity. Indeed, Stammers (1999) implored researchers to
recognize the significance of the link between human rights abuses and the impetus of a
population to act.71 By using existing theories about human rights discourses, Stammers suggests
that since the Enlightenment era, social movements have demonstrated the ability to challenge
the status quo by challenging the power structures surrounding the presiding regime.72 Rickford
(2019) also illustrates the unifying force of human rights discourses in his essay detailing the
history of the support of the Palestinian people’s struggle for freedom and liberation by Black
activists. He posits that Black activists shifted their support away from Zionists—who they
believed were similarly situated to them prior to the conclusion of the Second World War—after
they began employing the same colonial strategies against the indigenous Palestinians that Black
activists had been protesting.73 The increased levels of globalization and solidarity evidenced by

Stammers, N. (1999). Social movements and the social construction of human rights. Human Rights Quarterly,
21(4), p. 980.
72
Stammers, “Social movements and the social construction of human rights,” p. 989.
73
Rickford, R. (2019). “To Build a New World”: Black American Internationalism and Palestine Solidarity. Journal
of Palestine Studies, 48( 4), p. 52.
71

28

Stammers and Rickford offer creedence to extant hypotheses that maximalist campaigns—such
as those that revolve around abuses of human rights—require broad bases of support to succeed.
The effects of human rights abuses were also potent during the Arab Spring uprisings that
swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, as well. Although many factors contributed to
the spread of the revolutionary fervor throughout the region, most scholars agree that desires for
basic human rights and democratic governance ultimately played the biggest role in sustaining
the protests and fueling their spread.74 As Nuruzzaman (2013) asserts, repression of human rights
was an especially vital tool for the authoritarian regimes in the MENAP region, which claimed
strong rulers were necessary for maintaining social and political stability in a post-colonial
environment.75 Empirical evidence of repression as a motivating factor for mass resistance was
also found by Chenoweth and Stephan (2008), whose study supported the connection between
repression and civil resistance.76 Although theoretical links exist between repression and violent
group formation, the empirical evidence for a correlation between the two is less established for
violent groups than it is for nonviolent groups.77 One theoretical explanation for this observation,
proposed by several researchers, suggests that weak states that do not have a monopoly on the
use of force to silence dissent will experience the rise of more violent nonstate groups.78 Thus,
consistent human rights abuses by a country’s regime would be expected to be met with high
levels of nonviolent resistance.
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H2a: As human rights abuses increase in a country,
violent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.
H2b: As human rights abuses increase in a country,
nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.
Although several studies have found that a state’s regime influenced the emergence of
nonstate groups, the regime type itself has consistently been found to have a differing influence
on a group’s decision to utilize violent means. Despite some disagreement,79 the consensus was
that democracies generally witnessed the emergence of more violent groups than autocracies.80
Possible explanations for this phenomenon include the barriers democracies face to harshly
repress violent groups as well as their relative willingness to negotiate with them.81 Other
research cited the participatory nature or democracies along with other key features of the
system—such as rule of law, free and fair elections, and accountability—as possible explanations
for the lack of correlation between democracies and violent challenges to state authority.82 Others
offered middle-ground explanations for the relationship between regime type and emergence of
violent groups by suggesting that it was not necessarily democracies but anocracies that were
victimized by nonstate violence (regimes that were somewhere in between democracy and
autocracy).83 This explanation used an anocratic regime’s ineptitude with both democratic
constraints (e.g. competing political factions) and autocratic features (e.g. violent repression) to
account for its inability to suppress violent groups.
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However, the debate from security scholars seemed to be largely ignorant of the duality
of violence. That is to say, for a violent campaign to have emerged a nonviolent campaign did
not. Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) addressed this discrepancy in their groundbreaking
comparative study of the emergence of different types of social movements, which led them to
discover that most nonviolent movements tended to emerge in countries with enduring
authoritarian regimes whereas most violent movements emerged in weaker, more democratic
countries.84 Their study was one of the first to compare violent and nonviolent resistance
movements and offered valuable insights into why violence and nonviolence tended to be
deployed in different ‘environments.’ However, this does not match the pattern we see in the
MENAP, which emphasizes the need for a region-specific analysis of nonstate group behavior.
Moreover, because the states in the Middle East generally provide for large segments of the
population through social welfare programs, most grievances tend to be with the exclusionary
neo-patrimonial system as opposed to other aspects of authoritarian regimes.85
H3a: As a state’s polity score increases, it will experience
more violent events initiated by nonstate groups in that country.
H3b: As a state’s polity score decreases, it will experience
more nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups in that country.
A final factor that influences the behavior of both violent and nonviolent groups is state
capacity. State capacity refers to a state’s ability to both provide services to its citizens while also
exercising a monopoly over the legitimate use of force as a means to maintain public safety. It is
often used as a measure to distinguish “weak” states from “strong” ones. As with the research
presented on regime type, studies analyzing state capacity found that nonviolent movements
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tended to emerge in strong states that could repress them (because they were able to mobilize
enough of the population to successfully challenge the regime),86 whereas violent movements
emerged in weak states that were unable to suppress a challenge to their authority.87 Studies of
state capacity have also expanded beyond governmental ability to respond to security challenges
and have begun to account for other matters of government incapability that affect the broader
population, as well. From this perspective, states with low capacities are often viewed as unable
to effectively provide services, govern, or provide security to their people. Although there are
many cases where service provision through voluntary action is deployed in benign ways (as
evidenced in the discussion of responses to displaced people in Jordan), it has also been well
documented that violent groups can use such methods to manipulate public opinion and highlight
the shortcomings of the government.88 In addition, if a government is unable to function
effectively or if parts of the country are consistently ignored, it is more likely that the state will
witness the emergence of groups seeking to fill that void.89
An especially poignant example of a nonstate group exploiting ‘weak’ states through the
provision of services and governance could be seen with the rapid ascension to power of the
Islamic State organization (ISIS). The organization was able to establish itself and thrive in parts
of northern Iraq and eastern Syria as a result of weakened governments and wars in both
countries.90 The organization was also able to garner support from the residents of the territory it
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conquered by providing governance and other services to people in areas that had been beyond
government purview as a result of years of compounding domestic factors. By establishing
committees to oversee basic social services such as electricity supply, waste disposal, health
spending, and education, ISIS was able to establish itself as a more capable provider of
governance to the people under its jurisdiction than the internationally recognized governments
in the countries it held territory in.91 However, despite having lost its last territorial claim in
March 2019, the organization was able to continue exploiting the poor security situations in both
Iraq and Syria in ways that led the Inspector General for the American Combined Joint Task
Force on Operation Inherent Resolve (the name given U.S. military operation against ISIS in Iraq
and Syria) to draw attention to the group’s continued ability to exploit the diminished capacities
of the states in which it was operating.92
Similarly, the situation that prompted the onset in 2014 of (and subsequently fueled) the
Libyan Civil War was the exponential rise of independent militias seeking to establish
themselves as security providers in the wake of the country’s Arab Spring revolution in 2011,
which resulted in the assassination of its embattled leader, Muammar Gaddafi, and the overthrow
of his regime.93 Indeed, General Khalifa Haftar,94 whose Libyan National Army waged an assault
against the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord, established his claim to
power on the basis of his ability to unite local militias against the threat ISIS posed to the country
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between 2011 and 2014.95 He positioned himself as the ultimate security provider, able to bring
peace and stability to a country that was neither in favor of the authoritarianism they had just
abandoned, nor the democracy that had been imposed on them by the United Nations.96 In light
of these examples it is thus hypothesized that if a state cannot protect itself from attacks, nor
operate efficiently and effectively, it should experience more activity from nonstate groups than
more capable states.
H4a: As a state’s capacity decreases, violent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.
H4a: As a state’s capacity increases, nonviolent events initiated by nonstate groups
in that country will also increase.
Research Design
The goal of this chapter is to understand the circumstances under which nonstate group
activity is most prevalent. Specifically, this research aims to understand how domestic factors
influence group behavior by conducting a country-year analysis of 22 countries in the Middle
East, North Africa, and South Asia from 1997 to 2018 (Table 2.1). The parameters of the
MENAP region were primarily set by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)
with the exception of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are rightfully coded as being part of
South Asia. However, the decision to include them was made based on their geopolitical
relevance to the greater MENAP region and to increase the sample size of events.
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The temporal scope of the study is also dictated by the ACLED data, which extends back
to 1997 in North Africa and up to 2016 in most of the Middle East, as shown in Table 2.1.97 The
ACLED dataset was chosen primarily due to its currency (data for this study ended in early
September 2019), as well as for its thoroughness in tracking both violent and nonviolent events
across most of the globe. Observations in the dataset are based on news reports of events and
each event is coded to include data on the type of event, the type of actor who perpetrated and
was affected by the action, and the location of the event, making it very useful for analyzing
changes to group behavior.

Dependent Variable
As observations in the ACLED data are predicated on the occurrence of an event, the
dependent variable in this section will be number of events. According to the ACLED, an event
“involves a designated actor … [and] occurs at a specific named location … on a specific day.”98
The ACLED codes for six different types of events: battles; explosions and remote violence;
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violence against civilians; protests, riots; and strategic developments.99 The aim of this chapter is
to determine what prompts deviant behavior in a society generally; however, since the research
discussed in the previous section firmly established that violent and nonviolent groups were
motivated by different factors and arose in different contexts, the codes were split into two
dummy variables to differentiate violent events (battles, explosions and remote violence,
violence against civilians, and riots) from nonviolent events (protests).
The resulting variables accounted for violent or nonviolent events perpetrated only by
nonstate actors in the region and time period of interest. Government actions were excluded in
this chapter in order to ensure that the analysis was accounting only for the change in nonstate
group behavior and the variables that could possibly predict it. In addition, the strategic
development event coding was excluded from this analysis because it encompassed both violent
and nonviolent subevents that were more characteristics of turning points in a conflict than of
increased or decreased nonstate group mobilization generally. Strategic developments and
government actions will both be explored in more depth in the following chapter.
Explanatory Variables
The analysis will test four independent variables based on the hypotheses presented
above. These will include refugees, human rights, polity, a nd state capacity. Data for the
refugees variable was drawn from the World Development Indicators’ (WDI) yearly count of the
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total number of refugees and asylees per country of asylum. The data were combined with the
WDI’s yearly population data for the sample countries to create a standardized variable of
percent of the population that were refugees in order to better analyze whether their presence
significantly influenced the dependent variable, number of events.
The human rights variable was derived from the ACLED data by creating a country-year
variable of the total number of government-initiated instances of violence against civilians to
track trends in repressive behavior by the government. The polity measure comes from the
PolityIV dataset, which tracks yearly changes in a state’s political system on a scale ranging
from negative ten (perfect autocracy) to ten (perfect democracy). Although it is standard practice
to include a squared term of the polity variable when conducting an analysis of the highly
autocratic MENAP region, when the variable was included in this study it did not change the
results in any significant manner and was thus excluded to ensure the results were clear and
concise.
Finally, the state capacity variable was drawn from the Fragile State Index (FSI), which
indexes a variety of factors within countries on a yearly basis to estimate a total state fragility
score. Individual variables are scored on a scale from one to ten, and the sum of the variables are
then combined to create a total state fragility score (which, in this case, is being called state
capacity), which amounts to 120 points. Twelve individual indicators are measured on a scale of
one to ten, where lower values indicate higher degrees of stability and higher values indicate
higher risks of violence, instability, and state collapse. Two of these indices (security and uneven
development) are used as control variables in the analyses and their collective values were
subtracted from the total FSI score to ensure their measurement validity. It is important to note
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that since the FSI tracks state fragility as opposed to state capacity, larger values indicate worse
conditions within a state.
Control Variables
Previous studies have also identified several additional variables that have been found to
be related to increased group activity. These include population, ongoing conflict, legitimacy of
security apparatus, uneven development, and regime durability.100 Population, as mentioned
above, is drawn from yearly WDI data and logged to account for the large spread of the data.
Larger populations were expected to be correlated with both violent a nd nonviolent events. T
 he
ongoing conflict was coded as dummy variables and drawn from records of ongoing civil wars
and popular uprisings that occurred within a country during the scope of the analysis. It is
predicted that an ongoing conflict would increase the likelihood of both violent and nonviolent
events.
Variables for legitimacy of security apparatus a nd uneven development were measured
using FSI data which indexed each variable and produced a measure from one to ten, with lower
values indicating higher fragility. Less security and less development were anticipated to be
correlated to violent events, w
 hile more security and less developments w
 ere expected to predict
nonviolent events. Finally, regime durability was measured using PolityIV data and indicates the
strength of a regime by measuring the length of time (in number of years) since the last regime
change, as defined by a three-point change in a state’s polity score in a period of three years or
less. It is assumed that less durable regimes will experience more violent events, while more
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durable regimes will experience more nonviolent events. Table 2.2 lists the descriptive statistics
of the covariates present in the models presented in this chapter.

Design
As this study is chiefly concerned with counts of events, a quasipoisson regression
analysis was used to generate the results. This method was chosen due to the difference between
the dependent variable’s mean and variance, which failed to satisfy a key assumption for a
regular Poisson regression. The modification of the analysis allowed for a correction in the
standard errors which ensured they would not be heavily influenced by this disparity. In order to
account for the varying time frames of available data, the analyses were all offset by the
logarithm of the year for which the events were being recorded to normalize the results based on
the number of yearly observations available.101 Finally, three different analyses were conducted
to better understand changes in event types over time. The first analysis was run using a count of
the total number of events that occurred, then two subsequent analyses were done filtering for
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violent and nonviolent events, respectively. It is important to note that this study is primarily
interested in determining factors that influence event occurrences as a whole, and thus the results
of the first regression are meant to be the most authoritative; the results from the violent and
nonviolent event regression are only meant to offer additional context to the results to better
understand the types of events that are happening in the region.
Results
Although the results from the analyses presented in this section generally matched
previous findings from studies discussed earlier in this chapter, there are interesting instances
where they differ. Table 2.3 displays the results for the analysis of violent events that occurred in
the MENAP from 1997 to 2019. Interestingly, the model showed that refugees and violent events
were negatively correlated to each other, meaning that as the refugee population increases,
violent events will decrease (Model 0, Table 2.3). This goes against most of the conventional
thinking about the relationship between refugees and conflict including that of this thesis, which
suggests that hypothesis 1a be rejected. Conversely, there was evidence to support the
assumption of a positive correlation between human rights abuses a nd violent events. Thus,
hypothesis 2a, which posited that an increase in human rights abuses would lead to more violent
events, is accepted.
Polity was also found to be positively correlated to violent events, suggesting that
democratic-leaning regimes were more susceptible to violent nonstate mobilization than their
authoritarian counterparts. It is also important to take the significance of this value in the context
of the mean polity value of the region being researched which, at -2 (and as illustrated in Figure
1.1), is far lower than values observed elsewhere. This could imply that less stable democracies
or unstable anocracies are accounting for this trend, but the evidence does offer support for
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hypothesis 3a, which hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between polity and
violent events. Finally, state capacity appeared to have the most predictive value of the
explanatory variables (Models 0 & 4, Table 2.3). This supports hypothesis 4a and suggests that
high state fragility is linked to an increase in violent events.

As control variables, durability, conflict, and development were all very reliable
predictors of conflict; however, they did not act as expected. The durability variable suggests
that more entrenched leaders will elicit more violent nonstate mobilization, which contradicted
the results of Model 3 (Table 2.3). It was also interesting that conflict was negatively correlated
to the dependent variable when previous research would suggest that conflict provides less costly
opportunities for violent groups to achieve gains from the government. Finally, because the
uneven development variable was drawn from the Fragile State Index, the negative correlation to
violent events suggests that less uneven development (i.e. more equitable development) leads to
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more violent events since lower FSI values indicate better outcomes. Otherwise, the values for
population and security apparatus acted generally as expected.

Nonviolent events proved to be far less predictable than violent events. N
 either trends in
refugee populations nor in human rights abuses were found to be significant predictors of
nonviolent events, thus hypotheses 1b and 2b are both rejected. Polity was found to be positively
correlated to the dependent variable; however, hypothesis 3b posited that polity would be
negatively correlated to nonviolent events. Thus this hypothesis is also rejected (although the
strong tilt of events towards democratic-leaning regimes will be revisited in the next chapter).
Hypothesis 4b, which posited that nonviolent events would occur more frequently in states with
increased state capacity is supported by the result of Model 4 (Table 2.4), which indicates a
negative relationship between the fragile states index and nonviolent events.
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The controls for this analysis performed largely as expected with the same exception of
the uneven development variable, which was again negatively correlated to the dependent
variable. It should be noted that the persistent significance of the population variable is
something that has been noted by various scholars of nonviolent conflict—most notably
Chenoweth and Orion (2013)—as a marker of a nonviolent movement’s ability to reach the
1,000 participant threshold that is typically used to distinguish maximalist campaigns from
reformist campaigns.102 Finally, the security apparatus variable, which was the only other
consistently significant predictor of nonviolent events, performed largely as expected.
Discussion
This chapter aimed to understand nonstate group behavior through an analysis of the
yearly trends in the number of events perpetrated by nonstate groups a country in endured.
Departing from sociocultural theories of deviance, as well as theories of group motivation and
organization present in both the social movement literature and the conflict literature, a
conceptual framework aimed at using anthropological theories of societal norms and
expectations to understand how different groups react to changes in their environment was
devised to better understand what prompted changes in nonstate mobilization from year to year.
The analysis revealed that human rights abuses w
 ere strong predictors of violent events while
state capacity predicted both violent and nonviolent events.
There were several results from the analyses presented above that warranted further
discussion and recommendations for future research. The most potent and analogous of these
were the findings related to the trend between refugees a nd violent events (Model 0, Table 2.3).
The model suggested that a decrease in a state’s share of its refugee population would lead to a
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subsequent increase in violent events. This prompts several questions deserving of future
research about the relationship between refugee populations and violent events, especially at the
substate level. As the research cited in the previous section established, nonstate violence would
increase with refugee population in weak states that were not capable of effectively mitigating
the effects sudden population changes,103 however, such a relationship would be less common in
a state that was able to mitigate such changes. This suggests that more work needs to be done to
truly determine the influence of population changes on (violent) nonstate mobilization, as it
appears that state capacity is not singularly responsible for the relationships observed in previous
studies.
Another interesting trend which will be explored in more depth in the next chapter was
the relationship between polity and nonstate events. It was hypothesized that democratic regimes
would be more vulnerable to violent events, while authoritarian regimes would be more
susceptible to nonviolent mobilization. Neither of these assumptions were supported by the data,
however, the analyses did suggest that democratic-leaning regimes would be more susceptible to
nonstate events overall than their authoritarian counterparts. As was briefly mentioned in the
previous section, this could possibly be a result of the strong authoritarian tradition in the region
influencing how states become targeted by nonstate actors.
It is also important to note, however, that the influence of regime type on the prevalence
of nonstate groups within a state remains a contentious issue amongst scholars of conflict due to
the lack of definitive evidence to suggest a specific regime type is targeted more frequently than
others. This issue will be explored in more depth in the next chapter, which will explore how

103

Böhmelt, Bove, & Gleditsch, “Blame the victims?” p. 85.

44

theories of political survival inform the actions leaders take against nonstate groups. Special
attention will be paid to whether leaders of democratric regimes engage with groups differently
than autocratic leaders as a result of the different constraints each faces.

The relationships witnessed in the various results reported below also presented other
interesting findings, each with unique implications for how nonstate groups in the MENAP are
understood to act and react to changing conditions within a state. One such implication relates to
the reduced number of nonviolent events seen in states with higher rates of human rights abuses.
It is possible that this relationship was influenced by the various ways in which states responded
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to challenges to their human rights records by nonstate groups, which in turn, could have
influenced the types of nonstate campaigns that emerged (i.e. violent versus nonviolent). For
example, Iran is notorious for its harsh repression of dissidents, and its FSI score of 9.2 for
human rights and Polity score of -7 (Table 2.5) confirm the regime has the means to oppress its
citizenry if need be. Yet, between 2015 and 2019, 94% of the events that occurred in the country
were nonviolent. Similarly, in Bahrain—which has a Polity score of -10 and an FSI human rights
score of 8.8—63% percent of the events that occurred between 2015 and 2019 were nonviolent.
Conversely, in Tunisia and Algeria—two countries with positive polity scores and FSI
human rights scores around six—71% and 86% of the total events in the country were
nonviolent, respectively. Thus, it seems that despite strong theoretical support for the unifying
force of human rights issues, there have to be certain factors at play for people to mobilize and
for that mobilization to be successful. Understanding what those factors are could prove to be
very valuable for people living in oppressive conditions to understand how they can organize in a
high-security environment.
Finally, it is important to note the limitations imposed on the analysis by the available
data. Although datasets exist that catalog specific campaigns (e.g. NAVCO or FORGE), specific
conflicts (e.g. COW), or specific events (e.g. ICEWS or ACLED), it is difficult to find a single
data source that combines all of these elements to answer the question at hand. Furthermore, the
results from this analysis indicate that a MENA-specific study of both violent and nonviolent
movements is ripe for investigation with its many challenges to conventionational wisdom,
especially in a post-Arab Spring context. More complete data that assimilates the three factors
mentioned above and adds temporal depth to preexisting data could exponentially improve
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research on the emergence and behavior of nonstate groups, which could produce invaluable
positive externalities such as effective governance, improved security, and increased forms of
democratic participation. Indeed, generalizing the results of quantitative analyses to disparate
nonstate groups cannot provide a singular solution to countering them. However, the importance
of developing a framework within which group behavior can be understood cannot be
underestimated; for the consequences of the actions taken against the state are rarely confined
solely to those challenging its authority.
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Chapter Three
On 17 December 2011, Muhammad Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old fruit vendor, set
himself on fire outside the municipal offices of the seat of the Tunisian governorate of Sidi
Bouzid as an act of protest against the mistreatment of the lower class by those in power. This
dramatic event transpired hours after his produce was seized and he was publicly humiliated by a
local policewoman and ultimately sparked a wave of revolutions that would sweep the region.104
The country’s ruler at the time, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, had long sought to silence dissent and
opposition and thus was not sure what to do when the protests that Bouazizi’s act sparked began
to gain traction.105 He initially responded by offering small concessions to appease the protesters’
demands for better employment. However, Tunisians that had lived under Ben Ali’s system for
over twenty years saw little more than empty promises in the propositions their president was
making and instead demanded radical structural change.106
As the days wore on and the protests continued to gain momentum, Ben Ali saw that his
political survival rested on containing the protests, which prompted him to order his security
forces and his army to suppress them. However, at that critical point in the protests, the military
instead stood down and refused to fire on civilians, signaling that their allegiance was no longer
with the President.107 Tunisia is now viewed as the only success story of the so-called “Arab
Spring” it provoked because on 13 January 2011, Ben Ali gambled his prospects of political
survival on his perception of the strength of his security apparatus, causing him to suffer an
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incredibly costly political loss. By deploying his military, he sent a signal to protesters that the
status quo would be maintained by any means necessary without considering the costs he had
accrued both in his responses to protesters in recent weeks as well as his response to opposition
over his twenty-four-year tenure.
The focus of this chapter will be on analyzing how costs, such as those incurred by Ben
Ali in those fateful few weeks in 2011, shape a leader’s reaction to challenges by nonstate
groups. While understanding how domestic factors influence nonstate group activity can be
beneficial, it only partially explains group behavior. A more robust understanding of group
behavior must also take into account the role that governments and their leaders play in shaping
group behavior through the signals they exchange with each other. Thus, this chapter will focus
on how government interactions with nonstate groups can alter group behavior by attempting to
change the course of a conflict.
Departing from the assumption that the goal of most nonstate groups is to challenge state
authority or legitimacy either directly or indirectly, this chapter explores the impact government
reactions to such challenges have on conflict outcomes. This assumption will be tested through
an analysis of a selection of subevent categories derived from the strategic developments
variable from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED). This variable
“captures contextually important information regarding the activities of violent groups that is not
itself recorded as political violence, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political
dynamics within and across states.”108 Of the six subevent types109 the strategic developments
variable codes for, only three will be used to create measures of a state’s cooperative versus
108
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coercive b ehavior vis-a-vis nonstate challengers.110 Furthermore, for both clarity and to reflect
the nature of what this manipulated variable is measuring, it will henceforth be referred to as
government actions as opposed to strategic developments. This variable will lay the groundwork
for the main question this chapter seeks to answer: how do a leader’s or government’s actions
influence group behavior throughout the course of a conflict? The chapter will address this
question in four sections. The first section provides brief descriptions of a selection of the
existing literature on the concepts of audience costs and political survival. The second section
establishes a theoretical framework within which to empirically test how these theories can be
applied to asymmetric conflicts. Next, the third section will be an overview of the quantitative
research design. And finally, the fourth section will provide results with a discussion of their
implications for understanding conflict situations.
Literature
A theme that emerged from the analysis in the previous chapter revolved around how
government behavior influenced the occurrence of nonstate events. However, what remains
unclear is how a government’s actions during the course of a conflict can influence outcomes.
Although understanding how domestic factors influence the grievances people develop, such
studies only account for half of the factors that influence conflict onset and resolution. In order to
account for this disparity, it is thus also important to understand how leaders react to domestic
challenges to their authority and how these reactions shape the security environment of their
countries. The issue of political psychology on governance is well researched in the field of
political science and has branched off into other fields over the past several decades.111
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Especially of interest to this study, however, is the theory of political survival - which attempts to
understand a political leader’s behavior through their desire to remain in office. This theory
informs a large body of the conflict literature, as it offers explanations for why leader’s act the
way they do in times of crisis.
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) significantly contributed to the study of political survival
when they introduced their selectorate theory as a means to predict how leaders attain and
maintain political power.112 The theory derives from the central postulate that leaders are
primarily interested in remaining in power in order to accomplish their policy goals.113 In order to
remain in power, the leader must keep the ‘selectorate’—the groups of people tasked with
electing officials—appeased. The size of the selectorate will depend on the regime type, with
democratic rulers having to satisfy larger portions of the population than autocratic ones.
Importantly, selectorates are theorized to be ‘bought off’ differently depending on regime type,
as well. For example, the larger selectorates present in democracies are appeased through the
disbursement of public goods funded by tax dollars, whereas smaller selectorates present in
autocracies are given private, high-value goods to purchase their appeasement. This has
especially costly implications during times of conflict when a democratic leader is faced with the
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decision of reducing the proportion of public goods disbursed to the selectorate to fund a war
effort.114
Further attempts to formalize the understanding of conflict escalation as it relates to the
wartime decision making of political leaders were made by Fearon (1994), who presented his
theory of audience costs; a term used to describe the penalties a leader incurs in the eyes of their
constituents for escalating an international crisis and than ultimately backing down.115 According
to Fearon, a leader begins to incur audience costs when they initially decide to escalate a conflict,
which typically occurs when a lack of information sharing between leaders makes war the only
viable option.116 Fearon’s study showed that democracies were more prone to generating
audience costs than autocracies and were thus less likely to escalate crises into wars.117 However,
when democracies did escalate conflicts, they were less likely to back down due to the negative
impact a loss in battle would have on leadership favorability.118 Other studies have expanded the
theory of audience costs to apply to intrastate conflicts to better understand how political leaders
react to nonstate challenges.119 Prorok (2016) study, which focused on the specific behavior of
leaders in intrastate conflicts, determined that leaders deemed responsible for a conflict were far
more likely to experience extreme repercussions and were less likely to make concessions to end
a conflict.120 This was attributed to leaders’ aversion to being punished for participating in
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conflicts and thus offered explanations for why civil conflicts with no end in sight were more
difficult to resolve.
Subsequent studies have also expanded on the concept of audience costs to show that the
dichotomous characterization between democratic and autocratic leaders neglect to fully capture
the nuances found in different subtypes of regimes found within each characterization. For
example, Weeks (2008) deconstructed the theory to illustrate how audience costs can emerge in
the international arena when a leader is no longer viewed as legitimate or when other branches of
the government that wield significant amounts of power (like the military) decide to turn on a
head of state, as was seen in the Tunisian example presented at the beginning of this chapter.121
Through an analysis of Militarized Interstate Disputes that filtered for ten regime types,122 Weeks
found that autocratic regimes can be as vulnerable to audience costs if they are unable to control
how their role in the crisis is perceived both domestically and internationally.123 Nevertheless,
conceptualizing state behavior as a reflection of a leader’s decisions, as opposed to as a result of
the regime type in power, offered invaluable insight into the study of decision-making in conflict
situations.
The analytical portion of this chapter will continue the work of Weeks (2008) and Prorok
(2016) by analyzing how leaders react to domestic nonstate challenges in the heavily autocratic
MENAP region. This framework will produce results that specifically describe how leaders in
this region respond to domestic threats, which presents two significant implications for conflict
research. First, although the theories presented above are meant to address how leaders react to
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interstate crises that escalate to conflicts, the reality is (as Prorok points out124) the most common
type of conflicts since World War II have been intras tate conflicts.125 Second, it is important to
acknowledge that despite the control they are able to exercise, autocrats are still susceptible to
domestic threats, as evidenced by the ouster of Ben Ali. Thus, expanding theories of political
survival should be considered of paramount importance for generating updated knowledge to
match the changing nature of conflict. The following section will detail the theoretical basis for
the independent variables that will be tested in this analysis.
Theoretical Framework
The concept of political survival has been expanded in many ways since Michael Doyle
repopularized Immanuel Kant’s groundbreaking theory in a series of essays in the 1980s. An
especially salient branch of this research has developed out of the literature concerned with
understanding the phenomenon of democratic peace, which observes that democracies are less
likely to engage in armed conflict with other democracies due to the costs both countries would
incur domestically for such action. These costs, described as audience costs, suggest that
democratic leaders might be more susceptible to removal from office than their autocratic
counterparts during times of crisis or conflict and would thus be more risk averse. First
elucidated by Fearon (1994), this theory underscored the influence of regime characteristics and
political psychology on conflict outcomes.126
Some researchers have begun to apply theories of political survival to democratic peace
theory to better understand how leader characteristics can influence wartime decision making.
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London, Palmer, and Regan (2004) analyzed this question by exploring the influence of political
orientation in parliamentary democracies to understand how conflict impacts a leaders’
vulnerability to removal from office.127 Their study indicated that left-leaning parliamentary
democracies were more likely to see militarized interstate disputes escalate than right-leaning
parliamentary democracies—possibly as a result of the pressure that arises from the various
coalitions that form and the number of constraints on a leader’s power in this type of governance
system.128 Debs and Goemans (2010) used a model that accounted for a broader array of regime
types to understand how a leader’s propensity to engage in conflict affected their chances of
political survival.129 Their analysis, which examined how certain regime types within the
democratic-authoritarian dichotomization produced different kinds of leaders, found that leaders
could be driven by the desire for political survival to demand unreasonable concessions in an
effort to appear dominant, making peace increasingly difficult to attain due to the incompatibility
of the goals of the opponents.130
Other studies have also shown that despite the unwillingness of democracies to engage in
conflict for fear of its repercussions, they are far more likely to be the targets in international
crises than leaders in other regimes.131 Gelpi and Greico (2001) proposed that this disparity could
arise from the vulnerability of inexperienced leaders that have just been elected to political
office.132 Furthermore, their analysis found that inexperienced leaders were more likely to make
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concessions during times of crisis than experienced leaders. Another study conducted by
Wolford (2012) sought to understand how frequent changes in political leadership influenced
crisis bargaining and outcomes.133 His analysis determined that the ability of opposing leaders to
commit to an agreement could be fundamentally altered by the possibility of a turnover in
leadership in the near future that could lead to the election of a leader with different policy goals.
134

These studies showed the inherent vulnerability of democracies to crises despite their aversion

to initiating them and carried significant implications for when and how regimes became targets
of crises and how that influenced the ultimate outcome.
Especially relevant to this thesis and the research question at hand is the branch of
research on political survival as it relates to civil crisis bargaining. Applying this theory to civil
wars, Uzonyi and Wells (2016) argued that longer tenured leaders had more difficulty getting
rebel groups to commit to an agreement due to that leader’s lack of credibility, which they
attribute to a leader’s previous actions while in power.135 Their empirical analysis supported their
argument, which suggested that in addition to other exogenous factors related to civil war
duration such as third party intervention and the characteristics of the opposing groups,
autocratic leaders with few checks on their power are far less likely to resolve conflicts with
groups that fear the possibility of punishment for rebelling against the state after an agreement
has been finalized.136 Alternatively, Prorok (2018) analyzed the issue of civil war duration from
the perspective of leader culpability and the influence these views had on responsible and thus
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vulnerable leaders to draw out a civil conflict in the hopes of achieving a victory with time.137
Her study found support for her assumption that culpable leaders remained engaged in civil wars
longer than leaders viewed as less culpable for the conflict.138 The cumulative sum of the
literature presented in this section has suggested that the way governments and leaders choose to
respond to crises is impacted by several factors, but that a leader’s fear of repercussions is
incredibly salient in determining conflict outcomes. Thus, it is assumed that the rate of leadership
turnover will have a significant influence on whether, and to what extent, a government chooses
to engage nonstate challengers.
Hypothesis 1a: As rates of leadership turnover increase in a country,
so will instances of cooperative government action.
Hypothesis 1b: As rates of leadership turnover decrease in a country,
instances of coercive government will increase.
Another enduring question in the conflict literature—which goes beyond a leader’s desire
for political survival and harkens back to more traditional international relations studies—is
about how different regimes react to challenges to their authority. In the previous chapter, the
vulnerability of different regime types to nonstate group activity was analyzed in order to
understand which type of regimes experienced larger proportions of nonstate group activity.
However, in this chapter the nature of a leader’s response to a nonstate group based on the
leader’s regime type will be analyzed. This topic has long been a point of contention in the
literature due to the lack of definitive evidence for which types of regimes are more likely to
respond to nonstate group mobilization. Amongst the scholars who believe that democracies are
more likely to engage with nonstate groups, assertions are usually supported by evidence
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suggesting that democracies are more accountable to the people, making their need to reconcile
with substate entities more prescient.139 Moreover, the bureaucratic systems that are integral to
democratic regimes (i.e. legislative, judicial, executive, etc.) are also thought to offer more
avenues for such regimes to address nonstate group grievances democratically.140 However, there
is also evidence which suggests that democracies are more susceptible to coercion due to lower
opportunity costs associated with public participation in democracies.141
It is also important to note that the relationship between democracies and violent
expression could partially be explained by the lack of similar channels of expression in
authoritarian regimes, while other studies have found that the repressive nature of authoritarian
regimes allows them to insulate themselves from attack because they are better equipped to
respond to nonstate challenges by bending the rule of law to their will.142 Some researchers have
suggested that people harbor more grievances under authoritarian regimes, making them more
likely to mobilize against the ruler.143 Moreover, other studies have established an empirical link
between levels of repression and domestic terrorist incidents, which suggests that in the absence
of nonviolent means of expression, people will turn to more extreme measures to express their
dissatisfaction with the regime.144
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The debate in the literature over the responses different regime types express towards
nonstate groups is, in some ways, reflective of the volatility of regimes to domestic factors. For
example, the historically authoritarian regime in Algeria has been taking steps to engage with
peaceful protesters who are demanding democratic reforms in the country, which include a
complete restructuring of the current government.145 Although the protesters have consistently
rebuffed the government's attempts to ameliorate the situation, the government has indeed
attempted to implement some reforms despite the implications that would have for the existing
government. The atypical pivot of the country’s historically authoritarian regime towards a more
democratic means of engagement with protesters underscores the uncertainty that remains in
determining how regime type influences the reaction a government will have to nonstate
challengers. Conversely, Pakistan, which has long been coded as a strong democracy by the
Polity Project, has struggled to engage democratically with the various separatist groups vying
for autonomy from the central government’s control.146 Moreover, despite experiencing an
increase in its polity score from 2017 to 2018, its Prime Minister has been criticized for using
increasingly authoritarian tactics to suppress opposition groups and journalistic freedom, enough
to warrant condemnation from the international journalism watchdog, the Committee to Protect
Journalists.147 However, because of the influence democratic mechanisms would have on both a
leader’s ability to engage nonstate challengers as well as on their political survival (by virtue of
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selectorate theory), it is believed that more democratic regimes will engage with nonstate groups
more frequently.
Hypothesis 2a: Democratic (and democratic-leaning) countries will engage in cooperative
actions with nonstate groups more frequently than autocratic countries.
Hypothesis 2b: Autocratic (and autocratic-leaning) countries will engage in coercive
actions with nonstate groups more frequently than democratic countries.
Also related to both political survival and regime type is the influence the number of
civilian casualties a conflict produces has on the likelihood a government engages with nonstate
groups. This variable can contribute to decisive actions in several key ways. First, it can foster
government engagement with groups if the groups are able to strategically target civilians in a
way that puts pressure on the government without costing the group public support.148 Scholars
who have researched groups that use these tactics have reported mixed results when analyzing
their effectiveness empirically. Some have found that suicide bombings can be especially
effective at helping a group obtain territorial concessions,149 whereas other researchers have
found that strategic violence can decrease a groups chances of governmental concessions
because it can prompt target countries to infer group objectives from the short term consequences
of their actions as opposed to from the group’s actual stated goals.150 Further, research has shown
that killing a group’s leader will increase the chances of violence against civilians through their
propensity to aggrieve lower-level members of a group as a result of the leadership deficits that
result, regardless of the group's strategic aims.151 One source of agreement amongst these pieces,
however, is the ability of nonstate groups to inflate the cost of a conflict for a leader by
148
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strategically targeting civilians. This implies that groups that exploit this strategy more
frequently should enjoy the benefit of engaging with a leader and gaining concessions more
frequently.
Another interesting dynamic of pressuring the government through civilian casualties is a
nonstate group’s ability to regulate a nongovernmental organization’s ability to provide vital
medical aid to populations in need. This branch of coercion has only recently begun to gain
traction in the scholarly community with researchers from several disciplines contributing to
studies that illustrates both the frequency with which these activities occur as well as the
devastating effects they can have.152 Medical doctors have been at the forefront of bringing
attention to the issue by using their positions at prestigious research institutions to elevate the
voices of doctors in the field who have attempted to provide care in conflict situations and have
experienced the lack of support from international governing bodies when their attempts are
blocked first hand. A dominant theme in the literature on the security of medical aid workers
rests in the lack of human rights protections for doctors that facilitate their targeting by nonstate
groups attempting to alter the outcome of the conflict,153 with subsequent quantitative studies
illustrating the efficacy of this strategy by delineating a connection between increased neonatal
mortality rates in conflict situations.154 Indeed, the challenges of providing medical services in
the conflict situations being discussed by medical professionals have deeper roots in issues of
weak governments and their inability to adequately provide services to their citizens. Thus, it is

See, for example, Batniji, R, et al. (2014). Governance and health in the Arab world. Lancet, 383, pp. 343–355;
and Wise, P. H., & Darmstadt, G. L. (2015). Strategic governance: Addressing neonatal mortality in situations of
political instability and weak governance. Seminars in Perinatology, 39, pp. 387-392.
153
Footer, K. H. A. & Rubenstein, L. S. (2013). A human rights approach to health care in conflict. International
Review of the Red Cross, 95(889), p. 167; and Rubenstein, L. S. (2013). A way forward in protecting health services
in conflict: moving beyond the humanitarian paradigm. International Review of the Red Cross, 95(890), p. 331.
154
Wise, & Darmstadt, “Strategic governance,” p. 391.
152

61

important to be mindful of the ways these situations can be further exploited in conflict
situations, often to the detriment of innocent bystanders.
An additional way civilian casualties can spur decisive government actions is when they
come at the hands of the state itself. Governments can also be the perpetrators of violence
through their repression of protests movements.155 However, these tactics can prove to pose a
serious risk to a leader’s political survival as was evidenced by the outcome of the Arab Spring
uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. Furthermore, studies have found that repression can backfire
(known as ‘political jiu-jitsu’) if the means to communicate violent repression to a wide audience
are present, thus precipitating governmental concessions.156 One study found that economic
structures that necessitated foreign dependency (as opposed to self-sufficient resource-based
economies) were more likely to experience negative consequences from the violent repression of
protesters as well due to such countries inability to withstand foreign economic pressures, which
could subject them to the mechanisms of selectorate theory and put the regime in jeopardy.157
Finally, state-sanctioned violence against protesters can also generate costs to the regime by
motivating attacks against it, making these actions incredibly costly to a leader that perpetrates
them.158 Thus, because of the influence of both the internal and external coercive capabilities that
follows from an increase in civilian casualties, it is assumed that an increase in civilian casualties
should eventually lead to an increase in decisive actions.
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Hypothesis 3a: As number the number of civilian casualties increases in a country,
so should the number of cooperative government actions.
Hypothesis 3b: As number the number of civilian casualties increases in a country,
so should the number of coercive government actions.
Finally, the analysis also seeks to analyze whether changes in the amount of foreign aid a
country receives leads to subsequent changes in a leader’s behavior. Inspired by the revelations
about the influence a country’s economy has on its willingness to concede to protesters after
violently repressing them, this section looks at additional literature that has analyzed how donor
countries have attempted to use foreign aid to influence the behavior of recipient countries.
Much of the literature on this topic has been devoted to understanding how foreign aid can be
deployed an in attempt to prevent conflicts (called ‘securitization’),159 how it can support peace
agreements in post-conflict situations,160 its efficacy at promoting the goals of the donor country,
161

and finally, its influence on the occurrence of terrorist incidents.162 However, little research

seems to focus on whether foreign aid can alter the outcome of an ongoing civil war.
Historically, theories conceptualized the world system as one characterized by conflict,
but recent research has suggested that economic policy has been used by donor countries more
often to help recipient countries.163 These types of disbursements are typically referred to as
‘positive sanctions’ and are seen as a strategic tool donor countries can use to influence
outcomes in a recipient country.164 Currently relevant and well-studied examples of ‘positive
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sanctions’ include the links between the disbursement of Official Development Assistance
(ODA) and cooperation in the ‘War on Terror.’165 Of the few studies that attempt to explore the
effects of foreign aid on civil conflict, results are decidedly mixed. There is some agreement on
the positive correlation between civilian killings and aid disbursements from donor countries,
although whether these killings are perpetrated largely by rebel groups or the state is disputed.166
Moreover, the type of aid has been linked to differential outcomes in conflict situations. For
example, while military assistance has been found to encourage governments to cease targeting
civilians, development aid has been found to perpetuate state-sanctioned civilian killings.167
Especially relevant to the research question presented in this chapter were the findings
presented in a study exploring aid disbursement patterns to countries where leaders faced an
elevated risk of losing power. The study found a significant correlation between aid
disbursements and endangered leaders that suggested that foreign aid could be especially useful
to newly-elected democratic leaders attempting to build a large coalition, but can eventually
become a liability once that coalition is built.168 Although other studies investigate how aid can
or has been used to influence the political survival of recipient leaders, few have considered how
‘negative sanctions’169 can serve to purposefully increase the costs a leader incurs during a
conflict in order to encourage a swifter resolution.
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Although little evidence of the success of this tactic exists at the time of writing, recent
attempts to employ it have been made by the United Kingdom through a landmark court ruling
stating that the country’s arms sales to Saudi Arabia—one of the key aggressors in the conflict in
Yemen—were unlawful under international law,170 as well as by the United States through a
Congressional resolution to cease aid to Saudi Arabia due to its involvement in the war in Yemen
(though the resolution was ultimately vetoed by the President).171 When examining these
examples of what could be considered ‘negative sanctions’ being deployed in the region, it
should follow that the change in behavior the donor countries hoped to trigger would materialize.
Thus, the fourth hypothesis posits that changes in the amount of foreign investment a country
receives, whether through government aid or foreign direct investment, will influence the
number of decisive government actions the country chooses to engage in.
Hypothesis 4a: An increase in the amount of foreign investment a country receives
will positively influence the cooperative actions a government engages in.
Hypothesis 4b: An increase in the amount of foreign investment a country receives
will positively influence the coercive actions a government engages in.
Research Design
In order to test the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical section, a multivariate
regression analysis will be conducted to predict the influence of the variables described above on
the occurrence of ‘strategic developments.’ This is a classification made in the Armed Conflict
Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) to signify events during a conflict that are contextually
significant but not necessarily overtly violent and that was renamed to ‘decisive government
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actions’ for clarity.172 However, because the analysis is selecting only three variables codes out
of over thirty possible variable codes, the possible sample size was greatly reduced both as a
function of there being fewer total observations as well as the observations not being evenly
distributed across the region. Although this presents a serious limitation on the extent to which
the findings can be generalized that must be acknowledged, it does ensure the measurement
validity of the study remains strong due to the selection of only the most relevant observations
for the analysis. Figure 3.1 illustrates the available data for the country-year unit of analysis
which will be used for this analysis.
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Dependent Variables
In keeping with the theme of political survival of this chapter, the ‘strategic
developments’ variable from the ACLED dataset was chosen to test the conflict dynamics
between governments and nonstate groups due to its ability to capture contextual actions taken
by these actors to alter the direction of the conflict. These contextual events are believed to carry
more significance than other events due to their ability to highlight both the successes and
failures of the bargaining process and how both sides can use their unique resources and tactics
to apply pressure to the other side by increasing the costliness of the conflict. This event
classification includes six subevent types: agreements; arrests; change to group or activity;
headquarters or base established; looting or property destruction; and nonviolent transfer of
territory. To construct the ‘decisive government action’ variable used in this analysis, the data for
agreements and nonviolent transfer of territory were extracted and combined to form a
cooperative government action v ariable, and the data for arrests was extracted to make a
coercive government action variable. The variable was also created to ensure that all actions it
described were initiated by the government173 against nonstate groups.174 As a result, it is
believed that the variable can accurately predict how states respond to nonstate challenges in a
domestic context.
The cooperative government action v ariable signifies instances where a government
exhibited conciliatory behavior towards nonstate groups by brokering an agreement with them as
well as by facilitating peaceful transfers of territory between a nonstate entity and the
government. Conversely, the coercive government action v ariable underscores instances when
173
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governments take overtly hostile measures to cripple a nonstate group. This is reinforced by the
ACLED codebook, which notes that the arrests subcategory is only applied to cases when mass
arrests are conducted or when a particularly significant individual in a group’s hierarchy has
been detained. This underscores the strength of the strategic development/decisive government
action variable at measuring important occasions of government reaction to nonstate provocation
since the variable focuses on how opposing leaders choose to respond to certain events by either
escalating or resolving a conflict. Figure 3.2 illustrates the total number of government actions
per group type and year for the time period analyzed in this study.

Explanatory Variables
Political survival was measured by creating an Executive Leadership Turnover variable
that counted the number of years an executive leader was in power before a regime change
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occurred (regime change years are coded as ‘year 0’). This method was chosen to ensure that
countries (such as Bahrain whose leader has been in power since 1971 but only has
accompanying ACLED data for the period from 2016-2019) have meaningful observations
recorded in the data. This measurement method was important because it allowed the variable to
inherently control for regime type through larger observations as well as offer context for
situations where a conflict aimed at regime-change erupted. It is also important to note that
executive leadership was determined based on the person recognized as the one with the most
executive power in the country according to its constitution, meaning it was not always a
president or a king. Further information on positions and elections used to measure this variable
can be found in the appendix.
The polity m
 easure comes from the PolityIV dataset, which tracks yearly changes in a
state’s political system on a scale ranging from negative ten (perfect autocracy) to ten (perfect
democracy). Although it is standard practice to include a squared term of the polity variable
when conducting an analysis of the highly autocratic MENAP region, when the variable was
included in this study it did not change the results in any significant manner and was thus
excluded to ensure the results were clear and concise.
Data for civilian casualties were also drawn from the ACLED dataset to create parity
between observations with the dependent variables. In keeping with the aim of this chapter to
measure how governments and their leaders react to the rising costs of conflict, the civilian
casualties variable measures the total number of civilian casualties per country-year regardless of
the event that caused the civilian casualties to occur. This allows the variable to provide context
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on the costs a leader may be incurring that could spur them to engage with armed groups. The
variable was logged to simplify the model by scaling the observations.
Finally, a variable capturing fluctuations in foreign investment into a country was created
by averaging the change in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the change in Official
Development Assistance (ODA) a country received per year. Both variables originally came
from the World Development Index (WDI) and presented the data as a percentage of the
country's economy the disbursements represented. Change was calculated for each by subtracting
that year’s value with the previous year’s value for both FDI and ODA. To measure the
magnitude of the change in foreign investment, the change for both measures were combined
before being averaged. This allows for the tracking of change in investment patterns by country
on a standardized scale in order to accurately determine the effect such changes have on a
leader’s actions.
Control Variables
As with the previous chapter, population data from the WDI will be used as a control
variable to determine whether the strength of its influence on the dependent variables will
persist, as well as to measure for the size of the audience a leader would be accountable to. The
variable has been logged to account for the large size of the observations. It is believed that a
larger population will put more pressure on a government to act in the face of nonstate
challenges, thus leading to more government action. A regime durability w
 as measured using
PolityIV data and indicates the strength of a regime by measuring the length of time (in number
of years) since the last regime change, as defined by a three-point change in a state’s polity score
in a period of three years or less. This variable provides important context to the executive
leadership change variable by differentiating between changes in leadership between parties as

70

opposed to within parties, which would influence political agendas and outlooks within a
country. This is especially useful in a region such as the MENAP region with its legacy of
enduring authoritarian rulers where a regime change could significantly influence the policies a
country adopts—especially as it relates to a country’s nonstate groups. It is believed that durable
regimes will engage less frequently in cooperative action than unstable regimes.
The total number of events that occurred during a country-year is also being included in
this model to assess the context in which decisive government actions are occurring and how
leaders are responding to nonstate group activity. It is believed that changes in the number of
events should lead to increased decisive government actions; however, whether those actions are
cooperative or coercive would depend on other domestic factors. Finally, a variable for
legitimacy of security apparatus w
 as measured using FSI data which indexed each variable and
produced a measure from one to ten, with lower values indicating a higher probability of
violence or state collapse. It is hypothesized that the FSI score for legitimacy of security
apparatus will differentially influence the type of government action that is pursued. Table 3.1
lists the descriptive statistics of the covariates present in the models presented in this chapter.
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Design
Since the observations of this chapter do not fit the criteria for a quassipoisson analysis,
this chapter implemented a negative binomial analysis instead. In order to account for the
varying time frames of available data, the analyses were all offset by the logarithm of the
country-year175 for which the events were being recorded to account for the uneven distribution
of observations between countries and years.176 Additionally, due to the small sample sizes for
both dependent variables being tested in this chapter, a full-model test with all the independent
variables tested together against the dependent variables could not be done without
compromising the validity of the results. Thus, to gauge the combined effect of the key
independent and control variables on the dependent variable, each set of independent variables
(key and control) were tested against the dependent variable in models titled 0a and 0b to
account for both the small sample size and the need to understand how variables will interact
with each other in the model. The results are presented below in tables 3.2 and 3.3.
Results
The results of the negative binomial analysis present several interesting trends. The first
of which was that executive leadership turnover was significant only for cooperative government
action (Model 1, Table 3.3). The positive relationship to the dependent variable suggests that less
entrenched rulers are more likely to broker agreements with nonstate groups than their more
entrenched counterparts. This supported hypothesis 1a, which posited that lower rates of
executive leadership turnover would correlate to more cooperative action. There was no
evidence to suggest that polity h ad any influence on cooperative government action, therefore
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hypothesis 2a is rejected since regime type does not seem to play a significant role in a
government’s ability to take decisive action against a nonstate challenger.

Additionally, civilian casualties were found to be positively correlated with cooperative
government action (Model 0a, Table 3.2). However, this relationship is only present when tested
against the other key independent variables, which suggests a diminished prediction capability as
a key mechanism to predict government action. The relationship still offers support to hypothesis
3a, which posited that an increase in civilian casualties would lead to more cooperative
government action. There was no evidence to support hypothesis 4a, which posited that an
increase in foreign investment in a country would lead to an increase in cooperative government
action.
The control variables generally performed as expected as they related to cooperative
government action, with the exception of population. When used to predict cooperative
government action, it was hypothesized that a larger population would correlate to more
government action due to the increased pressures from the selectorate and the increased audience
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cost a leader would face from not resolving a conflict swiftly. The results from Table 3.2 suggest
that smaller populations correlate to more cooperative government actions. This could suggest
that weak regimes that lack the capability to face nonstate challenges are more likely to coalesce
if the selectorate is small and the security apparatus is conducive to violence or state collapse.
Also of note was the significance of regime durability and security. which proved to be the most
significant predictors of cooperative government action, suggesting that cooperative action t ends
to occur in situations where the number of events puts pressure on a regime to act, but doing so
cooperatively poses less of a risk to a ruler’s political survival than attempting to subdue an
opponent through coercive action.

The results for coercive government action showed interesting differences from the
results seen in the analysis of cooperative action d isplayed in Table 3.2. Among these was the
lack of evidence to support hypothesis 1b, which posited that lower rates of executive leadership
turnover would correlate to increased coercive government action (Model 1, Table 3.3). Another
contrast from the first set of results was the inverse relationship between polity and coercive
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government action (Model 2, Table 3.3). This offers support for hypothesis 1b, which posited
that authoritarian regimes would engage in more coercive action than their democratic
counterparts.
Civilian Casualties were also found to be positively correlated to coercive government
action, both in the partial model (Model 0a, Table 3.3) and in the full model (Model 3, Table
3.3). This supports hypothesis 3b and suggests that targeting civilians is the most reliable way to
elicit a governmental response, although whether that response will be detrimental or beneficial
to a group’s organizational structure and goals is far less predictable. Investment change also
indicated some correlation to coercive government action when the one-tailed p-value was taken.
This offers modest evidence to hypothesis 4b and suggests that increases in foreign investment
can lead to more productive securitization efforts in the face of threats to state authority.
The control variables in this analysis also performed largely as expected. Most notably,
many of the relationships between the control variables and cooperative government action were
inverted when the dependent variable was changed to coercive government action. This was
most apparent in the population and security variables, which was positive for coercive actions
and negative for cooperative actions (Table 3.3). This suggests that states with larger populations
and stronger security apparatuses are more likely to engage in coercive government action. The
number of events a state endures is also consistently positively correlated to coercive government
action, suggesting that coercive government action is sparked by an accumulation of costs
incurred by a leader, seemingly as a result of not taking action to restore order (Table 3.3).
Finally, durability became a far less consistent predictor of government action in this analysis;
however, it did indicate an inverse relationship to the dependent variable suggesting that weaker
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authoritarian regimes were more likely to engage in coercive action, possibly as a way to
maintain an image of authority (Model 2, Table 3.3).
Discussion
This chapter sought to determine the extent to which a leader’s response to a nonstate
challenge influenced conflict outcomes. the results presented in the previous sections provided
several avenues for future research, especially for those interested in continuing to contribute to
research on both state and nonstate leaders’ incentives in conflict situations. Furthermore,
expanding the sample of this study beyond the MENAP region could provide future studies with
insight into how the ‘turning points’ measured by the decisive government actions v ariable
influence conflict onset and resolution in other regions and how such patterns differ on a global
scale.
One interesting trend that merits future research was the difference in the ability of the
leadership turnover and the regime durability variables to predict decisive government actions.
As is noted in the research design section, the durability variable measures the amount of time a
regime is in power as defined by a three-point change in a state’s polity score in a period of three
years or less. This differs from the executive leadership turnover variable, which measures the
actual period of time that a leader is in power and thus more accurately captures the implications
of certain events and decisions that characterize a leader’s tenure. Table 3.4 illustrates the
relationship between different regime characteristics and types of decisive government actions to
illustrate how these variables function in practice.
When the variables are analyzed descriptively, trends that could further influence conflict
outcomes become apparent. For example, more autocratic countries (with the exception of
Israel) are less likely to engage cooperatively with nonstate groups than their democratic
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counterparts. Furthermore, the region’s democratic c ountries (in this case, Pakistan and Lebanon,
but again, not Israel) are the only ones that consistently engage cooperatively with their nonstate
groups, which suggests that either democratic mechanisms or threats to political survival
motivate democratic leaders to come to a consensus with opposition groups, although by slim
margins. Finally, another noteworthy trend is that countries that have experienced conflict at
some point since 1997 are also more likely to engage both cooperatively and coercively with the
nonstate groups that challenge them. Taken together, these trends suggest that in times of peace,
regime type does influence how governments and leaders engage with nonstate groups—though
further research would be needed to determine which specific mechanisms influence this
relationship—while conflict necessitates leaders of all persuasions to adapt by displaying a
willingness to make concessions.
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Two other variables that exercised significant influence worthy of future research over
the dependent variables and in this section were population and security. It was assumed that
cooperation would occur in states with larger populations while coercion would occur in states
with smaller populations since government cooperation has generally been viewed as symbolic
of rewarding the preferable behavior of modest groups,177 which are generally those that are
nonviolent and operate in a country where the population has the capacity to effectively support
the efforts of a successful nonviolent campaign.178 However, the results of this analysis suggested
that larger populations were conducive to coercive government actions while smaller
populations were more likely to elicit a cooperative r esponse from the government. It is likely
that since this analysis is attempting to understand government behavior, these values are
representative of the selectorate theory and a leader’s perception of the share of the population
that will hold them accountable for the actions they choose to take to counter nonstate groups.
The relationship between security and decisive government actions presents another
interesting yet troubling trend. The results indicated that weak security was correlated to
increased cooperation while strong security was linked to increased coercive r esponses. This
suggests that regimes with strong security apparatuses are able to stifle opposition, likely at the
expense of their citizen’s human rights, which Chapter Two indicated was a significant predictor
of unrest. This suggests that coercive measures to address dissent and opposition create a
self-perpetuating cycle where repressive responses to nonstate mobilization fuel some of the
same grievances that motivate nonstate groups to mobilize in the first place. Moreover, the
correlation between weak security and cooperation also suggests that if a state is unable to
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project an air of authority, they will continue to remain the subject of nonstate attacks. This
presents issues for state stability that could impact social functions far beyond the scope of the
conflict, which presents issues for a state’s capacity to function properly and provide services to
its citizens. Understanding how these different regime characteristics influence noncombatants
and the cycle of conflict in a country is important for understanding how conflicts are sparked
and how enduring peace can be achieved.
Although this study is believed to have made valuable contributions to the study of
conflict, it did face several limitations. The most significant, which unfortunately hinders even
the most impactful studies, was the availability of relevant data. More detailed data on contextual
events and ‘turning points’ in conflicts would have been especially beneficial for making more
definitive claims about the relationships between the variables this study analyzed. More
congruity between temporal data for countries could have increased the internal validity of the
study, as well; although the work of the people who put together the ACLED dataset does not go
unappreciated. Finally, an infinite amount of time to parse through the data and test every
possible iteration of every possible relationship would have likely been unproductive, but
perhaps have provided additional interesting results. Despite these limitations, the study provides
new information on how states react to nonstate threats that offer several critical avenues for
future conflict research.
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Conclusion
This thesis was focused on two central questions: what motivates nonstate groups to
instigate a challenge against the state, and what factors influence a state’s decision to engage
with nonstate groups that challenge their authority? Despite the volume of research that has
emerged in the onset and resolution of asymmetric conflict and the surge of terrorism in the wake
of the attacks of September 11th, scholars have struggled to ascertain a unifying theory to
explain why certain individuals or groups choose to rebel and how that rebellion is perceived and
treated by governments it threatens. Unified theories of conflict and terrorism are indeed difficult
to discern due to the numerous and multifaceted contexts within which conflicts arise. Deviance
theory and the humanist approach generally underscored how groups that chose to adopt
different methods tended to emerge from similar contexts and were influenced to rebel against
state authority by similar factors. By applying concepts from the structural school of
anthropological thought, this thesis attempted to present an alternative perspective to the study of
conflict by using the labeling theory of deviance to generate a comprehensive image of the ways
in which conflict onset and resolutions are shaped by the actions of the participants.
The first chapter gave an overview of the extant literature on nonstate groups in the
MENAP region, with an emphasis on their formation, their motives, their decisions to choose
violent over nonviolent methods, and their functional roles in the larger geopolitical landscape of
the region. The substance of this chapter served to create an understanding of the breadth of
literature and related hypotheses on the emergence, function, organization, methods, and
distribution of nonstate groups to inform the specific theories and relationships that were tested
in the following chapters. The overarching themes explored in this chapter established the
direction for the research questions that were analyzed in the following two chapters.
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Departing from theories concerning the radical flank effect in social movements and
group organization and goals, and informed by the labeling theory of deviance that underlies the
theoretical basis of this thesis, Chapter Two sought to formulate an understanding of nonstate
grievances and mobilization through a country-year analysis of event occurrences. The
multivariate analysis tested the impact of four factors consistently found to impact nonstate
mobilization—refugees, human rights abuses, polity, and state capacity—to determine the extent
of the effects they had on the number of both violent and nonviolent events a country experienced
in a year. The results indicated that human rights abuses, polity, and state capacity all had
statistically significant influences on the dependent variable and that, as was expected, the
dependent variable was differentially influenced by violent events and nonviolent events. The
results of this analysis provided insights into avenues for future research to reevaluate the impact
of refugees on the stability of a state and offered further credence to extant theories that suggest
the potency of human rights violations as a catalyst to nonstate group mobilization.
Chapter Three explored the relationship between cooperative and coercive government
behavior in order to understand what factors were most likely to prompt a government response
to nonstate mobilization. Similarly based on the labeling theory of deviance that has guided this
thesis as well as theories of audience costs and selectorate theory that form the basis of theories
of political survival, the research presented in this chapter determined that polity and violence
against civilians were two of the most reliable predictors of government actions against nonstate
groups. Additionally, the models suggested that security apparatuses also influenced a regime’s
decision to employ coercive versus cooperative methods, although the relationship differed
depending on which dependent variable was being tested. These results were consistent both

81

with the results in Chapter Two and the previous research generally. Broadly, the results suggest
that anocratic regimes with strong security apparatuses and high human rights abuses by nonstate
groups were more likely to elicit coercive behavior from the government, whereas anocratic
regimes with high human rights abuses and weak security apparatuses are more likely to
cooperate with nonstate groups. This presented interesting implications for the containment of
nonstate groups in terms of their perception of the opportunity costs associated both with
carrying out attacks against civilians and continuing to mobilize, depending on the political
environment in which they are operating.
When considered in concert, the results from chapters two and three underscored the
significance of human rights violations as a mobilizing factor for both nonstate groups as well as
state actors. Attacks on civilians by both states (Chapter Two) and nonstate groups (Chapter
Three) were shown to have significant effects on nonstate mobilization and mitigation. These
results underscored the disregard for the value of civilian lives in situations of limited state
stability and the cost paid by bystanders and noncombatants to bring about the change sought by
nonstate actors. This indicates the need for enhanced mechanisms to sanction actors who violate
the autonomy of civilians and noncombatants in ways that perpetuate an environment of
increased state fragility. Such mechanisms could also prove valuable in mitigating the influence
of such factors on conflict onset and bring about positive changes in state stability that could
ultimately reduce the frequency of asymmetric conflict.
Weak security apparatuses were found to predict all forms of event occurrences (Chapter
Two), as well as the likelihood of a government to engage a nonstate group in cooperative action
(Table 3.1). This presents interesting insights into the ways in which security structure of a
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regime can have a significant influence on the durability of a country’s peace, in that strong and
repressive apparatuses may prompt nonstate mobilization through their direct targeting of the
civilian population, whereas weak and ineffective security apparatus can indirectly harm the
civilian population by failing to prevent nonstate attacks aimed at gaining swift governmental
concessions. This suggests that state fragility and capacity to mitigate human rights abuses play a
role in the onset and resolution of conflict with nonstate actors and underscores the need for
research into the ways that non-physical forms of foreign intervention can assist conflict-afflicted
countries to address the fundamental issues that cause conflict.
The reciprocal relationship between human rights violations and instability also denotes
implications for state fragility that were not explicitly explored in this thesis. Specifically, the
relationship between human rights abuses and weak security apparatuses, as well as the
relationship between high state fragility a nd violent events presented in Chapter Two, suggest
that the environment fostered by the detrimental relationship a weak or repressive security
apparatuses can have on human rights can promote circumstances that make nonstate
mobilization increasingly likely, especially mobilization of a violent nature (as was evidenced in
Table 2.3). Table 4.1 presents rudimentary evidence to support the claim that state fragility,
security apparatuses, and violence against civilians are interconnected in problematic ways.
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As with most studies that seek to explain the natural phenomena through numbers and
graphs, the main limitation of this study was the availability of complete and cohesive data.
Although the recency of the ACLED data allows for the most current and pressing trends to be
analyzed empirically, its novelty comes at a cost when attempting to merge its observations with
those from other, less recent, datasets. This was a cost that was thoroughly contemplated and
deemed to be worthwhile in order to explore how singular events, as opposed to conflicts
generally, could explain a geostrategic landscape. It is hoped that with time the ACLED data for
the Middle East will continue to expand its historical scope to better gauge how the effects of
specific events—such as the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011—influenced the behavior of state
and nonstate actors.
It is also important to note that this study is limited by the geographic scope that it chose
to focus on. Although the decision to focus on the Middle East and North Africa was made to
understand theoretical concepts in specific contexts, it is important to note that the results do not
intend to make claims about the state of global conflict or to further misconceptions about this
particular region’s predisposition to violence or conflict. Valuable insights can be gained from
understanding how conflicts erupt in a region that bears the burden of being the focal point of
many nations’ foreign policy and diplomatic objectives, but it is important to note that a more
comprehensive understanding of conflict would be gained from a study that analyzed global as
opposed to regional conflict. Thus, the results of this study must be understood and applied only
within the narrow scope upon which they are focused.
Finally, as with any project capped by a deadline, this study was limited by the time that
was allotted for its completion. Indeed, with each new paper that was read and each new
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additional model that was run, it was believed that this study could be improved in one way or
another. Furthermore, in the end stages of this project, I realized that a global focus could have
offered more insightful results about the origins of and the responses to nonstate challenges to
state authority. However, expanding the project in this manner at such a late stage in the writing
process was infeasible. Future research would benefit from further analyzing the patterns
uncovered in this analysis in a global context to confirm their strength and directionality of the
relationships this research uncovered in a broader context.
Subsequent studies should also adopt an events-based global approach as opposed to a
regional one. Establishing that human rights abuses and inadequate security forces fuel conflict
in the Middle East and North Africa is important for policymakers seeking to formulate effective
foreign policy initiatives; however, the narrow scope of this research limited the generalizability
of the results. With intrastate conflicts making up the majority of the conflicts since 1950179,
producing knowledge that can apply to the varied contexts in which conflicts occur will
ultimately be more productive than doing so to inform policy decisions.
In addition to researching the effects of human rights abuses on state fragility, further
research could benefit from gaining a better understanding of how exactly refugees influence
both state capacity and nonstate mobilization. The results of the events-based analysis presented
here offered a different perspective on the nature of the causal mechanism than previous studies
that focused on the influence of refugees in the more analytically static context of conflict.
Although the influence of refugees on conflict diffusion is well defined in the extant literature,
such an approach to studying population changes only accounts for the extreme outcome of
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migration while failing to acknowledge that such patterns mostly only result in minor instability
in a country. The results in Chapter Two present a challenge to the prevailing wisdom of conflict
diffusion by suggesting that violent nonstate groups can gain an upper hand both on refugee
populations and the state by violently targeting these vulnerable populations. The lack of
acknowledgement in the majority of the conflict literature to the violence faced by migrants
illustrates an ignorance of the way such experiences shape migrants’ decisions on whether to
remain in a country or to settle there in the first place (an interpretation that would support the
results seen in Table 2.3), as well as the ways such violence could impact both state capacity and
the number of events a state experiences. Future research could expand on these observations by
determining whether other variables—such as changes in migrant populations, the end of
hostilities in a neighboring country, and changes in migrant dispersion patterns—influence the
relationship between refugees and nonstate mobilization.
Further avenues for future research stem from the results indicating that government
investment in a country experiencing conflict can increase the amount of decisive action a
government takes when faced with a nonstate challenge. The results from Chapter Three (Model
3.2) suggest that increased foreign investment in a country could lead to a parallel increase in
arrests of high-ranking members of nonstate groups. This relationship, as it is presented in this
paper, is promising but tenuous. Although decisive action to resolve conflict may be desirable for
the government, the long-term effects would need to be analyzed to better understand the
enduring effects of the choices to employ cooperative versus coercive action to subdue a nonstate
challenge. Foreign investment can be a powerful tool to support intelligence-sharing programs as
well as developmental programs that can alleviate underlying issues that lead to popular unrest.
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Thus expanding on the results of how exactly foreign investments can encourage productive and
durable conflict resolutions could offer valuable insights into how countries can provide support
to their allies in order to approach domestic conflicts in more productive ways, especially in a
region that is becoming increasingly wary of foreign intervention after years of failed invasions
and civil wars escalating to even deadlier and protracted proxy wars.
One final point which deserves future research is the relationship between state security
and human autonomy. As has been discussed already in this section, the strongest relationships
across all the models tested in this thesis related to the influence of human rights abuses and
security apparatuses on the occurrence of state and nonstate engagement. This seems to suggest
that, within this model, conflict amongst these actors occurs when a state’s attempts to maintain
a monopoly on the use of force infringe on the citizens’ sense of personal autonomy. This
presents a paradox in which a state’s attempts to protect its citizens from threats can evolve into
the object of a nonstate group’s motivation to challenge a regime. Although the relationship
between human rights abuses and state repression was not directly tested, researchers and
policymakers could benefit from understanding the security-autonomy nexus when determining
whether and how to respond to asymmetric conflicts that arise between nonstate groups and their
governments.
Ultimately, future research should focus on how the events that occur in a country can
create a climate that is conducive to either conflict or peace. By applying theories that look at
society as a whole and attempting to understand the ways that their conceptions of these events
are constructed, researchers can produce work that is observant of and attuned to the human
impacts, costs, and reactions to conflict. Furthermore, expanding on frameworks that analyze
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trends in event occurrences could allow for more meaningful interpretations of the dynamics that
emerge in countries that experience instability before, during, and after the conclusion of a
conflict. Finally, as has been voiced by other scholars, the most important duty of conflict
research is to generate understanding of difficult situations in order to minimize the harm that
they produce. It is hoped that this thesis met that standard and highlighted areas where policies
could be improved to ensure that every human can expect to live a just, dignified, and prosperous
life.
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Appendix
1. Event Type (dummies 1,0)
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1. Battles
2. Explosions/Remote Violence
3. Violence Against Civilians
4. Protests
5. Riots
6. Strategic Developments
2. Subevent Type (dummies 1,0)
1. Armed clash
2. Government regains territory
3. Non-state actor overtakes territory
4. Chemical weapon
5. Air/drone strike
6. Suicide bomb
7. Shelling/artillery/missile attack
8. Remote explosive/landmine/IED
9. Grenade
10. Sexual violence
11. Attack
12. Abduction/forced disappearance
13. Peaceful protest (start here)
14. Protest with intervention
15. Excessive force against protesters
16. Violent demonstration
17. Mob violence
18. Agreement
19. Arrests
20. Change to group/activity
21. Disrupted weapons use
22. Headquarters or base established
23. Looting/property destruction
24. Non-violent transfer of territory
25. Other
3. Inter1/2 (dummies 1,0)
1. Military
2. Rebel Groups
3. Political Militias
4. Identity Militias
5. Rioters
6. Protesters
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7. Civilians
8. External Forces
5. Region (dummies 1,2,3)
1. Middle East
2. North Africa
3. South Asia
6. Country (unique value 1:23)
1. Afghanistan 2017 - 2019
2. Algeria 1997 – 2019
3. Bahrain 2016 – 2019
4. Egypt 1997 – 2019
5. Iran 2016 - 2019
6. Iraq 2016 – 2019
7. Israel 2016 – 2019
8. Jordan 2016 - 2019
9. Kuwait 2016 – 2019
10. Lebanon 2016 -2019
11. Libya 1997 – 2019
12. Morocco 1997 – 2019
13. Oman 2016 – 2019
14. Pakistan 2010 – 2019
15. Palestine 2016 -2019
16. Qatar 2017 & 2019
17. Saudi Arabia 2015 - 2019
18. Sudan 1997 -2019
19. Syria 2017 – 2019
20. Tunisia 1997 – 2019
21. Turkey 2016 - 2019
22. UAE 2017- 2019
23. Yemen 2015 – 2019
7. Conflicts (dummy 1,0)
1. Afghanistan
a. Civil War 2001 – Present (Internal)
2. UAE
a. Yemeni Civil War 2015 – Present (External)
b. Sinai Insurgency 2018 – Present (External)
3. Bahrain
a. Decisive Storm 2015 – Present (External)
4. Algeria
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a. Algerian Civil War 1991 – 2002 (Internal)(SP)
5. Egypt
a. Intervention in Libya 2015 – Present (External)
b. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
6. Iran
a. Iranian Revolution – 1979 (Internal)(SP)
7. Iraq
a. War Against ISIS 2015 – Present (External)
8. Israel
a. Operation Chess (against Hezbollah) 2012 - Present (External)
9. Jordan
a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
10. Kuwait
a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
11. Lebanon
a. Fatah al-Islam Rebellion 2007 (SP)
12. Libya
a. Libyan-Egyptian War 1977 (SP)
b. Libyan Civil War 2011 – Present (Internal)
13. Morocco
a. Western Sahara War 1971 – 1991 (SP)
b. First Sahrawi Intifada 1999 – 2004 (Internal)
c. Independence Intifada – 2005 (Internal)
14. Oman
a. Gulf War 1990 – 1991 (SP)
15. Pakistan
a. War in North Pakistan 2004 – Present (Internal)
16. Palestine
a. Operation Protective Edge
17. Qatar
a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – 2017 (External)
18. Saudi Arabia
a. Intervention in Yemen 2015 – Present (External)
19. Sudan
a. Lord’s Resistance Army Insurgency 1987 – Present (Internal)
b. War In Darfur 2003 – Present (Internal)
c. Chadi-Sudan Conflict (External)
20. Syria
a. Syrian Civil War 2011 – Present (Internal)
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21. Tunisia
a. Bizerte Crisis 1961 – (Internal)(SP)
22. Turkey
a. American-led Invasion in Iraq 2015 – Present (External)
23. Yemen
a. Yemeni Civil War 2015 – Present (Internal)
8. Conflict in Neighbor (dummy 1,0)
1. Afghanistan
a. War in North Pakistan 2004 – Present (Internal)
2. UAE
a. NA
3. Bahrain
a. NA
4. Libya
a. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)
b. Chadian Civil War (2005-2011)
c. Sudan-South Sudan Border War (2012)
d. War in Darfur (2003 – Present)
5. Egypt
a. Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)
b. Libyan Civil War (2011 – Present)
6. Iran
a. Afghanistan Civil War (2001 – Present)
7. Iraq
a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
8. Israel
a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
9. Jordan
a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
10. Kuwait
a. NA
11. Lebanon
a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
12. Libya
a. First Sahrawi Intifada (1999 – 2004)
b. Libyan Civil War (2011-Present)
13. Morocco
a. Algerian Civil War (1991 – 2002)
14. Oman
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a. NA
15. Pakistan
a. Afghanistan Civil War (2001 – Present)
16. Palestine
a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
17. Qatar
a. NA
18. Saudi Arabia
a. NA
19. Sudan
a. Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000)
b. Central African Republic Bush War (2004-2007)
c. Chadian Civil War (2005-2011)
d. Libyan Civil War (2011 – Present)
20. Syria
a. NA
21. Tunisia
a. Libyan Civil War (2011 – Present)
22. Turkey
a. Syrian Civil War (2011-Present)
23. Yemen
a. NA
9. Leadership Changes -> so it would reset at zero on election year and count up after that
1. Afghanistan 2017 - 2019 (President)
a. SP: 2014 – Hamid Karzai -> Ashraf Ghani
2. Algeria 1997 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 1994 - Ali Kafi -> Liamine Zéroual
b. 1999 - Liamine Zéroual -> Abelaziz Bouteflika
c. 2019 - Abelaziz Bouteflika -> Abdelkader Bensalah
3. Bahrain 2016 – 2019 (King)
a. SP: 1999 - Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa -> Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa
4. Egypt 1997 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 1981 Anwar Sadat -> Hosni Mubarak
b. 2011 – Hosni Mubarak -> Mohammed Morsi
c. 2012 – Mohammed Morsi -> Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
5. Iran 2016 - 2019 (Supreme Leader)
a. SP: 1989 - Ruhollah Khomeini -> Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei
6. Iraq 2016 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 2014 - Jalal Talabani -> Fuad Masum
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b. 2018 – Fuad Masum -> Barham Salih
7. Israel 2016 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
a. SP: 2009 - Ehud Olmert -> Benjamin Netanyahu
8. Jordan 2016 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
a. SP: 2016 - Abdullah Ensour -> Hani Mulki
b. 2018 – Hani Mulki -> Omar Razzaz
9. Kuwait 2016 – 2019 (Emir)
a. SP: 2006 - Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah -> Sabah
Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
10. Lebanon 2016 -2019 (President)
a. SP: 2016 – Michel Sleiman -> Michel Aoun
11. Libya 1997 – 2019 (Chairman of the Presidential Council) (this is why the
‘ongoing conflict’ variable is important)
a. SP: 1969 = Muammar Gaddafi
b. 2011 – Muammar Gaddafi -> Mustafa Abdul Jalil
c. 2012 - Mustafa Abdul Jalil -> Mohamed Magariaf
d. 2013 - Mohamed Magariaf -> Nouri Abusahmain
e. 2016 -> Nouri Abusahmain -> Fayez al-Sarraj
12. Morocco 1997 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
a. SP: 1994 - Mohammed Karim Lamrani -> Abdellatif Filali
b. 1998 - Abdellatif Filali -> Abderrahmane Youssoufi
c. 2002 - Abderrahmane Youssoufi -> Driss Jetou
d. 2007 - Driss Jettou -> Abbas El Fassi
e. 2011 - Abbas El Fassi -> Abdelilah Benkirane
f. 2017 - Abdelilah Benkirane -> Saadeddine Othmani
13. Oman 2016 – 2019 (Sultan)
a. SP: 1970 - Said bin Taimur -> Qaboos bin Said Al Said (note:
Sultan Qaboos had not yet died during the time of the data
analysis, thus the transition is not noted)
14. Pakistan 2010 – 2019 (Prime Minister)
a. SP: 2008 - Muhammad Mian Soomro -> Yousaf Raza Gillani
b. 2012 - Raja Pervaiz Ashraf -> Mir Hazar Khan Khoso
c. 2013 - Mir Hazar Khan Khoso -> Nawaz Sharif
d. 2017 - Shahid Khaqan Abbasi -> Nasirul ul Mulk
e. 2018 – Nasirul ul Mulk –> Imran Khan
15. Palestine 2016 -2019
a. NA
16. Qatar 2017 & 2019 (Emir)
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a. SP: 2013 - Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani -> Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani
17. Saudi Arabia 2015 – 2019 (King)
a. SP: 2015 - Abdullah bin Abdulaziz -> Salman bin Abdulaziz Al
Saud
18. Sudan 1997 -2019 (President)
a. SP: 1989 - Ahmed al-Mirghani -> Omar al-Bashir
b. 2019 – Omar al-Bashir –> Sovereignty Council
19. Syria 2017 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 2000 – Hafez Assad -> Bashar al-Assad
20. Tunisia 1997 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 1987 – Habib Bourguiba -> Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
b. 2011 - Moncef Marzouki -> Beji Caid Essebsi
c. 2019 – Beji Caid Essebsi -> Kais Saied
21. Turkey 2016 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 2014 - Abdullah Gül -> Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
22. UAE 2017- 2019 (President)
a. SP: 2004 - Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan -> Khalifa bin Zayed Al
Nahyan
23. Yemen 2015 – 2019 (President)
a. SP: 2012 – Ali Abdullah Salih -> Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi
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